We Read

Konservatisme Media Massa

2011-10-13T23:06:00.002-04:00

Menyoal Konservatisme Agama di Media Massa:
Meneguhkan Peran Kritis Jurnalisme Kampus

Mohamad Abdun Nasir•

Merebaknya penerbitan-penerbitan buku, tabloid dan majalah agama dan menjamurnya program-program keagamaan di media massa memberi pengaruh yang tidak kecil terhadap model keberagamaan masyarakat. Di satu sisi, fenomena ini akan memberikan alternative model keberagamaan yang beragam bagi masyarakat dengan memberi peluang yang luas untuk memilih wacana agama yang ada sehingga terjadi proses dialogis antara media dan audien. Partisipasi masyarakat dalam membangun dan membentuk wacana keagamaan mereka sendiri yang lepas dari kontrol negara mendapat angin segar. Namun sangat disayangkan bahwa, di sisi lain, model keberagamaan yang diusung tersebut tidak semuanya menyuarakan semangat keagamaan yang progresif dan toleran. Sebaliknya, tidak sedikit dari media-media ini yang justru menjadi corong agenda gerakan kebangkitan agama yang cenderung sektarian dan ekslusif. Sementara kelompok mayoritas tetap mendominasi dan kelompok minoritas tetap terpinggirkan dan kurang terakomodir secara memadai, ada kelompok minoritas radikal yang mampu bersuara keras karena didukung oleh sistem komunikasi dan media yang baik.

Media massa baik cetak maupun elektronik memiliki pengaruh yang besar terhadap konstruksi realitas sosial dan pemaknaannya, termasuk dalam ranah agama. Agama bisa tampil dalam wajahnya yang beragam tergantung bagaimana media merepresentasikannya. Edward Said menjelaskan bagaimana Barat selama ini memanggungkan Islam. Menurutnya, dalam dasawarsa beberapa tahun belakangan, khususnya sejak revolusi Iran menarik perhatian Eropa dan Amerika, media telah mengekspose Islam; mereka memperlakukannya, memberinya karakter, menganalisisnya, dan dengan demikian membuatnya tampil sedemikian rupa. Agama dapat pula dimunculkan di media massa dalam aura yang absolut, rigid, kaku yang mensyaratkan penerimaan agama secara taken for granted. Dalam bingkai yang demikian, agama dihadirkan sebagai kebenaran mutlak yang tidak menghendaki proses humanisasi dalam penerimaan dan pelaksanaanya. Alhasil, agama kemudian tampil dalam wajahnya yang tunggal, monolitik dan anti pluralitas. Sebaliknya, ajaran agama bisa hadir pula dalam arus media dalam bingkai yang lebih kontekstual, toleran, dan interpretatif. Meski mengakui agama merupakan pesan dan nilai-nilai transendental, namun agama yang kontekstual dan intepretatif tidak menolak proses rasionalisasi dan kontekstualisasi karena agama tidak hidup dan hadir dalam ruang yang hampa. Kemungkinan agama tampil di media massa dalam dua wajah (rigid dan kontekstual) di atas sangat tergantung pada bagaimana, dan oleh siapa, doktrin agama tersebut direpresentasikan atau disuguhkan kepada audien dan pembaca. Oleh karena itu, ideologi agama, kepentingan politik dan ekonomi media massa sangat menentukan karakter wacana agama yang disuguhkan.

Untuk mewujudkan pandangan agama yang progresif di media massa bukanlah hal yang gampang karena suatu media, apa itu koran, tabloid, majalah ataupun televisi memiliki kepentingan yang berbeda antara satu dengan yang lain dan menerapkan strategi yang berlainan dalam mengemas berita dan informasi untuk ditawarkan kepada pembaca dan pemirsa secara lebih luas. Pertimbangan pasar, oplah, rating atau untung-rugi turut memboncengi kepentingan media massa. Tidak sedikit media massa yang demi mengejar oplah dan keuntungan secara tidak langsung, sengaja atau tidak, terbawa arus wacana keagamaan mayoritas yang kadang konservatif karena dipandang menguntungkan daripada mengekspose kelompok minoritas yang kurang memberikan kontribusi ekonomis bagi industri media massa.

Di sinilah arti pentingya menghadirkan penerbitan yang lebih memihak kepada agenda –agenda pencerahan dan toleransi keberagamaan. Dan salah satu agen sosial yang mampu memainkan peranan penting tersebut adalah mahasiswa melalui jurnalisme kampus yang profesional dengan misi dan advokasi idialisme yang tinggi. Tulisan ini dimaksudkan untuk menawarkan alternative pandangan tentang peran dan fungsi pers mahasiswa atau kampus sebagai counter discourse atas merebaknya konservatisme agama di media massa.

*Dosen Fakultas Syariah IAIN Mataram yang sedang menyelesaikan studi S3 bidang agama di Universitas Emory, Atlanta, AS. Makalah disampaikan dalam Seminar “Konservatisme Agama di Media Massa”, yang diselenggarakan oleh LPM Ro’yuna, PPMI Mataram dan SEJUK Jakarta, Jumat 1 Juli 2011 di Auditorium IAIN Mataram.

Pemetaan Pendekatan dalam Kajian Islam dan Jender

2011-01-14T19:22:00.002-05:00

Mohamad Abdun Nasir

Penggambaran jender dalam banyak literatur keislaman, terutama yang klasik (meski banyak yang kontemporer juga), seringkali dipenuhi dengan bias, stereotipisasi dan prasangka. Kitab-kitab tafsir, hadis dan, terutama, fikih merupakan genre referensi studi Islam yang seringkali merepresentasikan corak misoginis. Hal ini dimungkinkan karena berbagai sebab, antara lain, pertama, model pendekatan kajian yang condong bersifat literer pada teks, seperti al-Qur’an dan hadis. Alasan lain adalah karya-karya tersebut ditulis oleh para sarjana Muslim yang kebanyakan laki-laki yang tidak sensitif jender. Dengan demikian, hasil karya intelektualitas tersebut diproduksi dalam kerangka metodologi dan setting sosial yang spesifik. Oleh sebab itu, karya tersebut tidak bisa dipandang secara mutlak sebagai representasi Islam yang murni. Mereka hanyalah salah satu varian dari corak pemikiran keislaman yang mesti dilihat secara proporsional.

Karena itu, premis-premis dasar mengenai konsep penciptaan laki-laki dan perempuan, posisi mereka di depan hukum, kesaksian, warisan, hak dan kewajiban suami-istri, status hukum kelompok transjender dan isu-isu jender lainnya yang dirumuskan berdasarkan pada karya-karya tersebut tidak secara otomatis merepresentasikan pandangan Islam yang “haq”, sebab ternyata ada pandangan-pandangan lain yang berbeda yang juga berdasarkan pada teks-teks yang otoritatif. Metode dan pendekatan yang berperspektif jender dalam membaca posisi laki-laki dan perempuan dalam Islam tentu akan menghasilkan perbedaan bacaan dan pemahaman yang akan menempatkan hubungan jender pada posisi yang lebih seimbang, sebuah posisi yang dipromosikan oleh al-Qur’an dan hadis, sebagaimana yang diyakini oleh para feminis Muslim dan kampium keadilan jender. Dalam semangat demikian, muncul beberapa metode alternatif guna merumuskan ide keadilan jender. Para sarjana yang berkecimpung dalam proyek ini mencoba menggali semangat dan merumuskan metode baru yang mereka percaya sebagai sarana alternatif untuk memperjuangkan keadilan jender.

Berbagai metode dan pendekatan studi jender dalam Islam yang dipaparkan dalam tulisan ini menunjukkan nilai lebih masing-masing dan potensi masalah yang mengikutinya. Pendekatan teks sangat bermanfaat dalam rangka untuk reformasi dan reinterpretasi atas teks-teks yang dianggap bias jender. Masalahnya pendekatan ini seringkali berhenti sebatas pada wacana atau diskusi dalam ruang tertutup, sehingga tidak mampu melihat pada sisi praktis. Pendekatan sejarah membantu melihat kembali masa lalu dan mengungkap sisi-sisi dinamis hubungan jender yang tidak terekam dalam telaah normatif sejarah. Dengan sejarah kritis dan sejarah sosial, posisi dan agensi perempuan bisa dilihat dalam sejarah secara jelas, dimana dalam banyak teks pada galibya mereka sering dianggap inferior. Sementara pendekatan empiris mampu mengungkap pengalaman dan tradisi jender paling mutakhir dalam masyarakat Islam dan menawarkan berbagai cara pandang mengenai relasi jender, meskipun cara ini terbelit isu pencerabutan teks dari tradisi Islam.

Dengan mensinergikan pendekatan-pendekatan di atas, penulis berkesimpulan bahwa semua aspek baik teks, sejarah, konteks dan pengalaman empiris akan mampu mengisi gap dan kekurangan dari masing-masing pendekatan. Teks tetaplah menjadi faktor penting dalam membentuk pola pikir dan pola keberagamaan umat Islam. Menegasikan teks sama artinya dengan membuang separoh lebih tradisi Islam. Begitu pula aspek sejarah dan pengalaman empiris akan membantu memahami bagaimana teks dimaknai dan diterapkan dalam kehidupan yang riil. Teks tidak hadir dalam ruang yang hampa, tapi berada dalam kawasan pertarungan antara berbagai aspek dan kepentingan baik agama, sosial, politik budaya antar individu, kelompok dan negara atau kelas dan lain sebagainya yang terjadi dalam matra dan konteks sejarah yang spesifik.

*Artikel lengkap dimuat di Jurnal Qawwam, PSW IAIN Mataram, 2009

NU and the Quest of Moderate Islam

2010-07-04T05:25:00.003-04:00

By Mohamad Abdun Nasir

In April 14,2010, The Jakarta Post run an article about the role of religious organizations in keeping the country unity. The author gives a particular attention to NU. He argues that this organization holds a pivotal role in keeping the stability of the country. I agree absolutely. Historically this largest Islamic organization participated actively in the Independence movement. The state has awarded NU founding fathers as national heroes. Unlike recent flourishing Muslim organizations that maintains strong Islamic transnational networks and envisions the establishment of an Islamic state, NU was established in this country. To this organization, Pancasila is final and national unity is nonnegotiable. Looking at these records, it is unintelligible to question NU’s loyalty to the state. Discussing its spirit of nationalism is redundant.

Instead, the real question now is about its religious ideology. Is it still moderate or attuned to be conservative? Certainly NU, along with Muhammadiyah, is not extreme or radical. They are often regarded as the representation of moderate Indonesian Islam. However, if we consider recent cigarette, bank interest, early marriage and female genital mutilation fatwas issued by these two organizations respectively, we may question their moderateness.

NU has lately released two edicts regarding early marriage and female genital circumcision. The fatwa approved these highly controversial matters. A couple month ago, the Forum of East Java Female Pesantren, associated virtually with NU, declared that Facebook is forbidden (if it is misused). These fatwas are staggering.
As far as it is concerned, there is authoritative texts that neither conjoin nor forbid early marriage and the genital mutilation. The scripture does not set a limit for a proper minimum marriage age. No Qur’anic verse nor a sound Prophetic tradition sanction female genital mutilation. The fatwa were thus likely issued on the basis of secondary texts, such as jurist legal works. By endorsing such fatwa at the expense of primary texts and of social, economical and medical issues where early marriage could lead easily into family disharmony, manipulation and abuse and the genital mutilation could create women’s sexual and health problems, the fatwa echoes a setback in Islamic legal thought.

KH. Sahal Mahfudz, a re-elected NU Chairperson, once pronounced the idea of Fikih Sosial, a notion that Islamic law is best perceived as a social ethic for social enforcement. The idea reflects a strong wish to develop the methodology of Islamic law (manhaj) rather than to embrace its products (qaul) uncritically. Similarly, the late KH. Abdurrahman Wahid launched the idea of Pribumisasi Islam to ground Islam deeply rooted in its historical context. Islam in this perspective is conceived of being a universal and cosmopolitan religion that is able to interact with its local contexts. Islam is dialogic, accommodative and responsive. These are a bright idea, yet they apparently remain underdeveloped. The issuance of the two fatwa is a glaring example emerging conservatism and a bitter blow to that reform spirit.

A newly announced NU Central Board Member is dominated by male figures. Even no female member is found. This does not necessarily mean harmful, but another indication of its conservative bias and patriarchalism. In this view, women are seen inappropriate to occupy a central position in Islamic leadership. NU has for sure woman’s wing organizations, such as Muslimat and Fatayat. Yet, its central board that has the highest authority to direct the organization and to compose its strategic plan and agenda remain lacked of female figures. This could strengthen patriarchal and gender biases, as the two fatwas already demonstrated.

NU has a great number of potential cadres and female activists who are engaging in women’s empowerment at the social basis and local level. Pesantren, as its mass and cultural basis, has to a considerable degree participated in gender mainstreaming. Many pesantren have conducted various training in reproductive health, women’s life skill and human right campaigns. Pesantren graduates have also successfully made strong and qualified publications regarding gender issues, such a widely-read book Fikih Perempuan by progressive figure KH. Husein Muhammad. It is therefore justifiable to ask why these progressive button-up movements and reform spirits and voices from below do not touch its elite central organization. Are the myth of women as a source of chaos (fitna) and misogyny, as these are preserved in traditional literature circulated and read in traditionalist Islamic schools, still so appealing? This is perpetual theme, that should be addressed immediately.

Conservatism has also encouraged a fierce controversy over the involvement and active participation of NU young generations in Islamic liberal networks. This resentment has catapulted Ulil Abshar Abdalla from taking any position in its central board organization despite the fact that he was one of the chairperson candidates who earned not insignificant votes. These all are noticeable features, from which we might interpret NU’s current religious ideology.

It is of course unfair to judge NU new board regressive until it is conversely proven. The new board has just been elected and perhaps has not begun drawing upcoming agenda. However, it is now a right moment to raise the question on moderatism, hoping that they do not repudiate to accommodate this other voice from below. The phenomena discussed here are a real challenge that this organization faces. Managing such issues will considerably determine in its own image and character building as moderate. Success to resolve this challenge will move its position into the middle way. We hope and wait, but do not want to be disenchanted.

The writer is an Atlanta-based member of North America NU Community.

Critical-humanist religion

2009-10-13T04:52:00.003-04:00

Critical and humanist understandings of religion

Terrorism is not only a state of violence, but also a state of mind, an ideology. It is also a part of transnational movement stimulated by various reasons. There is no single cause or factor elucidating terrorism comprehensively. However, it is obvious that religion or religious understanding in many ways play a pivotal role to produce a violent ideology that leads to brutal activities, as terrorists often manipulate scriptures or erroneously points the idea of jihad to justify their terror attacks to innocent people.

In this respect, detaining terrorists or even killing them thus does not necessarily terminate terror attacks because this does not address the root of the problem. Many still holding similar views with terrorists are ready to become their future successors. When one terrorist dies, the others will come forward to take retaliation. Stern raids to terrorist camps might reduce terror acts temporarily. I do not mean to overlook security approach to terrorism, but this still needs a more fundamental approach to deal with it.

One important step to eradicate religious extremism, radicalism and terrorism is to invoke critical and humanist understandings of religion. The critical method necessitates comparative and comprehensive approaches. Through comparison, religious devotees will be familiar with various different interpretations within their religious tradition. They will acknowledge that religious scholars have already developed means and methods to expound a particular theme or doctrine. They will also understand that such-and-such doctrines are not given and self-evidence, but rather produced through such mechanism and processes that remain subjected to criticism.
The comparative method will make them aware that their choice of thought or school does not invalidate others’ choices since other also have their own argument. The idea behind comparison is that they will understand that their choice is not absolute, but relative, true. This will make them aware with strength and weakness in every school or tradition.

Religious fanaticism and bigotry commonly stem from a strict selectivity of thought and rebuttal of pluralistic interpretation. No religion is monolithic, and therefore no single narrative in a religion is authoritative and representative of, let alone superior over, all rest of other narrations or interpretations within one religious tradition. Unfortunately, the majority and dominant approach in religious studies seems to be normative, simply transforming doctrine from one generation to another. It fails to apprehend critically the history of religion and the production of a religious discourse, which were yielded from specific power relations within historically embedded time and place.

Likewise, religion should not be approached partially, but must be comprehensively. Partial understanding might lead to reduction and manipulation. Extreme interpretation of religion often stems from an exclusive selection to a particular notion, while declining other related issues. In the case of Islam, the Prophetic tradition that strongly fosters goodness and to prevent badness (amr ma’ruf nahi munkar), even though through the use of physical enforcement, is a good example to advance here. Radical groups such as The Islamic Defense Front (FPI) often understand it narrowly. This group simply employs this tradition to justify their violent action on the foreclosing of discotheques or cafes because they accused such places as being a center of moral decadence. They do not compare their argument with what the Qur’an said. The Qur’an clearly calls for Muslims to disseminate Islam with wisdom (hikmah) and good teaching (mau’idha hasanah), not with violence [Qur’an 16: 125]. This is a palpable example of failure in comprehensive understanding of the teaching of Islam.
The comparison also helps appreciate differences that exist both within internal religious traditions and amongst interreligious communities. This is a good start to stimulate sympathy to other faiths. By making comparison, it will uncover a common denominator lying behind diverse religious phenomena. There is an essence of religion despite various manifestations of religious practices. The essence can refer to a divine being or a spiritual existence. The essence might also refer to the spirit of affection, love and peace that every religion promotes. The notion of sameness and common denominator in religions should become a vital point from which religious humanism and the spirit of religious humanist embark. This spirit shows that religious devotees fundamentally share basic human needs and characters, such as the need to worship the spiritual Being and the spreading of peace and justice. It is what exactly humanist religion is. It is on this humanist notion that interreligious interaction and dialogue should begin.

This does not mean however that I advocate a unification of religion, because it is impossible to deny religious pluralism. What we need to do is to acknowledge others as human and religious beings with their beliefs, as we do. We do not have to judge other’s belief from our own faith. Neither do we need to fault others if they adopt different interpretations and practices from what we do. Every religious follower has a full right to implement their beliefs as long as they are realized within the frameworks of humanism, peace and justice. In contrast, every extreme view that might create exclusivism, radicalism and terrorism in the name of religion is simply contrary to spirit of humanist religion and therefore should be prevented through, among other things, critical and humanist understanding of religion

Mohamad Abdun Nasir, lecturer of State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) Mataram
and PhD student in Religion at Emory, Atlanta, the US.

Political Survey in The Indonesian Presidential Election

2009-06-20T09:56:00.000-04:00

The national campaign for the presidential election has just begun. All candidates, their campaign work teams and constituents have already prepared and run strategies to win the race. Pamphlets, banners and t-shirts depicting photos of the candidates with their respective slogans are printed and created and installed in streets, building and just on trees. No less boisterous is the involvement of various research institutions to participate in this campaign by providing a preliminary assessment based on surveys to the candidates’ chance to win the election. It is however tempting to pose critical questions about those surveys. Why are such surveys conducted prior to the election day, rather than after people give their votes? What do these preliminary findings means and suggest?

The first institution releasing their preliminary survey is the Indonesian Survey Institution that surprisingly announced their finding early that the incumbent president and his running mate, SBY and Boediono, receive more than seventy percent of the total respondent’ choice, leaving two other candidates away who are described to receive far less votes. Critical remarks arose to this survey since it is funded by Fox Foundation, which is also the political consultant of the incumbent’s political party. Regardless of their method and the participants of the survey, it is hard to say that the result is representative, since the credibility and acceptability of JK-Win and Mega-Pro are believed to be increasingly higher.

If you compare LSI survey with popular surveys conducted by mass media both printed and electronic, you might find a different picture, reflecting a competitive result. For example, Kompas online (June 9/09) features a recent survey that challenges an assumption made by the LSI survey. It shows that JK-Win gains 66.94%, Mega-Pro obtain 12.69% and SBY-Boediono only receives 20.37% from 2096 total respondents. Since this is a continuous daily survey and everyone can participate in it by sending a message through his/her own mobile phones, there might be a changing result every day. Yet, this is an obvious clue that different survey yields a different result.

Another example can be seen from the Media Indonesia online (June 9/09). It reveals that SBY-Boediono stands at the highest position gaining 52.8%. While JK-Win gets 11.7%, Mega-Pro receives 31.9% votes from the survey participants. Still another survey by Republika online discloses that until this survey is displayed on June 9/09, SBY-Boediono is still the most favorite candidate receiving 47 %, leaving their contenders who tightly compete to be the runner up. JK-Win and Mega-Pro receive almost the same votes, 26.8% and 26.4% respectively. If you pay attention to other revealed survey staged by the institutions affiliating with each candidate, the result will be more different, showing a more competitive result. All this suggest that it is still difficult to predict who will win the race.

I am neither assured nor doubted with all survey demonstrate. They have their own method and approaches to carry out their own research that might weaken or strengthen their claim. I am not concerned with the result either. What I believe is that the survey now seems to be a means of propagation. Some of them might be purposively designed to conjure up a certain image, persuading voters that this or that candidate is the best. Surveys thus constitute another campaign method rather than a pure research project. Although a pure research project might be itself debatable, but if those political surveys are compared to others relating to academic projects, I am quite certain that the result is much more reliable.

Let us wait and see the real result of the election when it is finally announced by the election commission, hoping that the result represent a fair and democratic process of the political transformation and succession in Indonesia. more importantly, the candidates must be consistent with what they have promised during their campaigns.

Mohamad Abdun Nasir
Indonesian student in Atlanta, GA

Don't abuse headscarves for political gains

2009-06-04T14:47:00.004-04:00

Do not Abuse Muslim Headscarves for Political Gains
Mohamad Abdun Nasir*
Jilbab has rarely been empty from political matters. It is often closely related to the shari’a-inspired regional ordinance. Recently, this issue suddenly attracts the national political discourse when the protagonists from the Muslim political party encourage SBY and Boedionos’ wives to adopt a jilbab. They believe it will strengthen this candidate potency to win the election, supposing that such a gesture of changing physical performance will cast many more votes from Muslim constituents. However, this suggestion seems to be less effective and tends to politicize religion for the sake of political interests, which is contrary to the principle of piety and compliance in observing Islam.

Jilbab has multiple meanings and purposes. It might convey messages about religiosity and piety of the wearer. It can also imply a glaring personal statement that the body is a very private domain that cannot be exposed to anyone and at any place. Moreover, it might symbolize a modern trend of fashion signaling a well-educated women studying at colleges or universities. Within this view, Islamic headscarf echoes urban lives and social class, rather than a village phenomenon of female headscarves worn by less educated people. For women of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, for example, their jilbab always signify their rejection to westernization and their support to the restoration of caliphate and shari’a law, and thus theirs are highly political symbol. In contrast, other women are wearing it while their behaviors do not necessarily confirm to what others expect so when they are donning it.

In short, jilbab hallows wide ranges of symbolic meaning, from religious, modern, social class, up to the politics of anti westernization. Based on such expositions, it is perhaps not an exaggeration to argue that jilbab largely represents a cultural symbol, despite a religious element in it. What we can infer from such phenomena is that it is not a merely religious, though it is obviously part of the Islamic teaching. Consequently, assuming that adopting it is an effective medium to attract Muslim voters is a tenuous argument. Following such a suggestion might exert influence for some, but not necessarily for others, let alone for larger voters. There is no guarantee that women wearing jilbab will necessarily chose the candidates of president and vice-president whose spouses don it, simply because they have commonality in their physical appearance. It is too simplistic to connect this garb with a political preference in the election. It would be misleading to assume that jilbab constitutes an effective mean as a vote getter among Muslim constituents. The fact that most Muslim parties loses their significant support in the last parliamentary election suggests that making religion including its paraphernalia and symbols as a political ideology and framework does not seem to be a very successful strategy and less convincing for the majority Muslim constituent. In contrast, they are more interested to give their votes to any party, which cogently addresses their basic issues, such as education, economy and legal enforcement. Why do then Muslim parties still insist on employing religion for their politics? Religion should be a moral guide for politics rather than its ideology. Likewise, politicizing jilbab to gain political support is futile and betrays the purity of Islam itself.

What is difficult is not how to adopt a jilbab, but rather the consequence of adoption to this sort of garb. It is easy to buy the best motif and elegant of headscarves since they are almost available anywhere with affordable prices. Yet, it is uneasy to put on them consistently since it entails mental and long psychological preparations, especially for those who hardly wear it. For those who know the fundamental meaning of jilbab will not take it just for common sense, simply following the trend but less meaningful or even meaningless. If a woman only uses it for a certain occasion with a particular aim, like showing her political interest, and thus removes it from her entire life, then that is not an ideal way. Even, this can lead to hypocrisy, which everyone must attempt to avoid. Ideally, taking an Islamic headscarf as part of observing religious commandment in general must be based on one’s own consciousness and consent. It should not be grounded on a political pretension. Nor is it based on coercion, because that would completely dispel the substance of religion. By this, I am not saying that jilbab is not obligatory. Nor I am against this garb. I just argue that using this as a political agenda and propagation violates the essence of it.

It is true that the commandment of this covering is sanctioned by the Islamic scriptures, such as the Qur’an and the Prophet tradition. The Qur’an mentions three different phrases regarding Muslim female dress such as hijab (a curtain) in Sura al-Ahzab (33):53, khumur (sing. khimar, meaning shawl), in Sura al-Nur (24):31 and jilbab (a long outer outfit) in Sura al-Ahzab (33):59. It is tempting to see how different phrases and the contexts of revelation are involved in this regard. According to Said al-Asmawi, a former Egyptian Grand Judge, these various verses indicate the complexity of the issue of female covering in Islam. While believing that the veil aims to protect women’s chastity, he is not trapped in the formalities of religion, spurring adoption of jilbab but neglecting its true meaning. To him, the core of Islam should not be overlooked and superseded only by its formal symbolism. He contends that the essential or substantial meaning of jilbab is to establish a self-control over any religious deviations and a psychological barrier to avoid sacrilegious attitudes. Unfortunately, Many Muslims are more interested in its formality, as they are also more interested in the slogans of Islam, like ‘political Islam’ and ‘Islamic government’, without knowing the meanings or purposes of such slogans.

The wide practice of covering mentioned by the Qur’an indicates that this issue is not a simple matter. While the interpretation varies, it is clear that no commentators connect those texts with any political context. They do not encourage women to adopt it for the political purpose either. Furthermore, in reality, the practice of Islamic female head covering might be not as simple as those texts expounds. Muslim women are dynamic and active human beings, following the rhythm of the changing time and space in order to suit themselves into the best choice on the ground of their own decision without necessarily losing their religious conviction.

*The writer is lecturer at the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) Mataram, Lombok.

Pros and cons over death punishment

2009-06-01T10:55:00.001-04:00

The imposition of death punishment

Death penalty has been a subject of legal and moral disputes over centuries. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, this rule ceases to be effective in many parts of the world. Although many states mostly in Europe now abandon it, other countries such as the United Stated, China and India still defend it. Indonesia belongs to the latter group.

The recent execution to Sumiarsih and her son Sugeng who found guilty of intentional murdering to the family of a police in Surabaya few years ago and the upcoming execution to the Bali bombing perpetrators have drawn a great attention from the public and the media. The debates stem from a basic question whether death penalty is a proper punishment in this civilized era and whether it is an effective way to deter potential criminals.

The opponents of death sentence contend that this is a state’s violence upon its citizens who have evidently committed certain crimes. Some others argue that death sentence violates human right and should therefore be lifted. Others simply consider this sentence ineffective in diminishing the criminal rate and will eliminate a possibility for the offenders to repent and return to the right path. Instead of killing the killers, some suggest more human and less severe sentence. Meanwhile the proponents mostly argue in reverse from their contenders claiming that such a punishment is a proportional retaliation and is capable of reducing crimes.

Other proponents stem from religion’s point of view. According to Costanzo (1997) religions recognize capital sentence. In the laws of Moses, for example, death penalties is meant to fulfill the God’s command and to avoid His anger to the society that is unsuccessful to punish sinners. Therefore the sinners must be murdered to “purge the evil from the midst of you”. Likewise, in New England from the late seventeenth century until the beginning of the nineteenth century, a religious ceremony was conducted near to the hallow where the ministers conveyed sermons appealing that the land should be cleaned up from any crimes as a symbol of disobeying God. In Islam, the concept of qisas (equal retaliation of punishment) has been affirmed in the Qur’an. It maintains that life must be kept secure at any expense, and any intention and planned effort directed to take illegally someone’s life away will be punished with an equal retaliation. Killing for living is the rational behind this legal stipulation.

However, the religious grounds for death penalty run at odd in the modern time and are replaced with rational human arguments. The most common logic to use behind death sentence is the concept of deterrence. According to it, the cruelest punishment will at best deter future potential criminals. If the penalty for a motorbike driver without using a helmet, for instance, were only one thousand rupiah, many people would not eager to use a helmet. Conversely, if a driver caught driving without a helmet and is obliged to pay fifty thousand rupiah, there will be fewer people driving without it. Similarly, if the strictest and most torturous punishments are imposed to criminals, this will deter future crimes at a maximum result.

Objections are often heard about this theory. It argues that capital sentence does not automatically deter potential crimes. Although death punishment has been imposed, crimes with its various means, forms and modus operandi will occur again and again. So why not switch to other kind of punishment which is more human than killing criminals? Why do not let the convicted spent the rest of their entire life in prison so that they can be saved from the Hallow or fire squad?

The objection might be accepted in certain conditions. Of the aims of punishment is to fulfill the justice of the victims and their families as the most suffering party. Therefore if the family of the victim grants pardon to the offender, then that might lighten the punishment and discount them from capital sentence. Or if the state authority consider that pardoning the offender would be better and not violate the justice of the victim and the society at large. However, in other cases, I think death penalty remains applicable for some other reasons, especially if the crime threatens public interests and security. Disrupting state’s interest and spreading terror attack that create public insecurity can be subsumed under this category and no offenders should be pardoned in this respect. Deterrence theory also applies in certain cases.

It is not always true that severe punishment like capital sentence will run ineffective in diminishing the crime rate as the objections suggest. Take the example from the Singapore’s strict rule against drug abuse and smuggling. In late 2005, the court in that country meted out a death penalty to Nguyen Van Tuong, an Australian citizen who smuggled illegal drugs to the country. Since then we have no more heard the similar crime, showing that capital punishment by hanging up the offender proves to be an effective means. The discovery of the largest illegal ecstasy fabric in Banten by the police last year and in another place in Surabaya recently demonstrates that the offenders overlook the punishment. Death sentence is the best punishment for excessive illegal drug producers and smugglers because they are threatening the public interest. Most consumers are the youths who are our next generation. This crime endangers the entire society and corrupts the youths’ morality. Therefore it is not only a crime ruining human body, but also social and political peril that endanger young generation and the strength of our country.

Likewise, terrorists deserve capital punishment as well. Terror attacks not only cause physical damages but also symbolic and psychological devastation. They have claimed many lives, mostly, if not all, innocent people. They have also created social insecurity, discouraged economic growth and caused instability and panics since people are afraid of running their businesses, observing services and worships and doing other regular activities. By imposing death penalty to terrorists, it will cut off permanently their chance from escaping the jail or simply from spreading their thoughts and extreme ideology through their notes, memoirs or books often written while they are in prison. Kastari’s escape from the jail in Singapore could be an important message that terrorist remains dangerous and might pose even a greater attack upon fleeing from prison.

Even moratorium of punishment to terrorists is not less dangerous. Because of the late execution, one of the Bali bombers Imam Samudra publishes his book Aku Melawan Teroris (I am against terrorist) attempting to convince his intended audience that his and his fellows attacks are justified by the scriptural text. In this book, he defends such actions from an Islamic perspective and claims them as waging jihad and retaliation against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This could be dangerous ideology misread and misinterpreted from the text since no jihad is conducted against unarmed, civil innocent people and not waged in the battlefield. This book has been reprinted for several times and has run out of its last editions. This is a victory of terrorists. Although they might be executed soon, their ideology remains alive for they have successfully documented it.

Lastly, public demand must also be taken into consideration in imposing death sentence. The recent online public poll conducted by SCTV, a private Indonesian’s television, about death sentence reveals that 99% respondent are in favor of this punishment, while the rest either disagree or simply put a neutral stand to it. Again, all these are obvious clues that death punishment for the reason of protecting public interest and security meets with a greater public demand of the society.

Religion and Ritual Tradition in Java

2009-05-26T10:20:00.001-04:00

Javanese Muslim Tahlilan Ritual:

Syncretism, Symbolic Communication and Honor in Islamic Tradition

Introduction
When Islam was firstly introduced to Java, some belief systems had already existed there such as animism, Buddhism and Hinduism. Instead of total rejection, Muslim preachers sought to adopt certain elements of these faiths and finally convert them. To some extent, this process does not remove entire local beliefs and consequently results in religious syncretism and convergence which can be seen as the best example in the ritual tradition called slametan. Basically slametan is a communal religious ritual with various offerings of foods served to its participants and, to a certain degree, the dead and ancestors’ spirit, especially in the areas where syncretism is deeply penetrated. It thus represents a complex interplay between religion, culture and local beliefs. Nevertheless, this ritual has invariably been performed by both abangan (nominal Muslims) and santri (devout Muslims) in Java, especially Muslim traditionalists living in rural areas. With this ritual, Javanese Muslims hope to gain a state of well-being for their transitional life cycles, such as for birthday (sepasaran), wedding (mantenan) and death (tahlilan). This ritual tradition is widely spread in Java and has been preserved for many years and through generations.

Slametan has become an object of inquiry among scholars. On one hand, some argue that slametan is a core of Javanese religion greatly influenced by a set of intertwined belief from animism, Hindu-Buddha and Javanese mysticism. On the other hand, others maintain that slametan contains a fundamental element of the Islamic doctrine as it can be seen from the recitation of certain Arabic passages derived mainly from the Qur’an during the course of this ritual. While the former applies a contextual approach to slametan revealing a social context of its meaning and practice, the latter employs a textual analysis to underline the normative basis for it. Another approach combines both textual and contextual analysis arguing that this ritual is a sort of syncretism that contains components of both Hindu-Javanese and Islamic doctrines. Since these approaches are employed to examine all sorts of slametan, they tend to offer a general description and consequently draw less attention to a specific performance of each slametan ritual. Despite a common intention to invoke a state of well-being, slametan is a broad term for practices covering the whole ranges of Javanese communal religious ritual feast. It, however, in fact varies. Each slametan has a specific purpose, performance, timing, and ornament indicating distinctiveness, richness and depth of each rite. It is not a static ritual tradition and has considerably changed over times. It therefore needs a more detail exposition for respective ritual.

This study does not however intend to achieve such a broad goal, but is rather aimed to especially focus on a specific slametan ritual which is devoted to the dead called tahlilan. There has been a dissenting opinion about tahlilan among Muslims. Within Muslim communities, neither modernists nor far right fundamentalists reckon it as Islamic warning that this ritual is a part of superstition and innovation which are not sanctioned by the authoritative Islamic scriptural texts nor by the prophetic tradition. Fanatic and ultra Javanese believers, like kejawen (Javanism) and kebatinan (Javanese mysticism), also do not practice it, as they commonly repudiate any ritual which contains Islamic elements. Besides, tahlilan constitutes enduring, complicated and most sacred ritual. However, since this ritual is admitted as being valid by santri and abangan then there should be Islamic and Javanese elements in it. This paper thus explores the elements of local beliefs and Islamic teachings in this living ritual tradition and demonstrates that both abangan and santri find a common denominator in it, a significant point which is hardly explored in previous studies.

The main question that will be answered in this paper is what constitutes a very basic idea of Javanese values and Islamic teachings that can be drawn from tahlilan ritual? Why do abangan and traditionalist santri who in many ways have different religious and cultural orientations attempt to preserve the same ritual tradition? This study supports previous finding stating that the elements of local beliefs and Islamic teachings are present in this ritual. So it is syncretistic in nature. In addition, this study specifically argues that the idea of honoring predecessors and maintaining an uninterrupted communication between the alive that is descendents and the dead namely the deceased predecessors and the late parents constitute a common denominator for both santri and abangan. In regard to tahlilan ritual, it is important to note santri’s variants and clearly distinguish them. They are two categories of santri: traditionalists who practice this ritual and modernists who do not. Throughout this study, the term santri refer to traditionalist Javanese Muslims, unless otherwise indicated. Although it is now debatable, the traditional santri category is best represented by the largest Muslim organization Nahdhatul Ulama. Meanwhile Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam (Persis) and salafi Muslim organizations are often claimed to have a modern religious orientation and puritan agenda.

I structure this study as follows. The first part discusses the debates around the variants of Javanese religion. This part discusses historical background of the rise of Javanese religiosity into abangan and santri category and explains the reasons for such a division The next part explores differences of slametan ritual between abangan and santri; how and in which ways they differ and how this ritual in general undergoes discernible changes over times. Popular traditions of each group will in a smaller portion also be presented to make a sense of their distinctive religious cultural orientation. Special attention will be given in the last part to examine tahlilan ritual.

Conclusion
Tahlilan, as one variant of slametan ritual tradition in Java, constitutes a common religious ritual for abangan and santri Javanese Muslims and is syncretistic in nature. Its exterior elements have been adopted from the old Javanese beliefs, while its interior essence is obviously Islamic. While syncretism of this ritual amongst abangan is mostly concerned with food offerings to the spirits and with burning incense, the same phenomenon is hardly found in santri’s ritual. However, santri does not totally remove the elements of old traditions as long as they are in principle not contrary to the fundamental confession. Santri is therefore willing to adopt the time pattern of this ritual which has no legal sanction from the scriptural texts. The text neither enjoins nor prohibits the time and date of the consummation of this ritual. The different performance and intentions of this ritual amongst abangan and santri are logical consequences from a long process of Islamization in Java. The division of the Muslim religiosity into the two poles goes back to the times of the Mataram Islamic Kingdom after the downfall of the last Javanese Hindu Majapahit Kingdom in the sixtieth century. The rulers of Mataram accepted Islam while maintaining previous Javanese-Hindu traditions. The polarization also stems from the cultural approach of Islamization in Java adopted by the nine saints whose method of preaching Islam entailed acculturation and convergence with indigenous aspects. As a result, that process inevitably creates syncretistic religious practices as it is evident from tahlilan ritual.

Although abangan and santri in some ways display their own respective distinctive religious propensity and cultural predilection, they have sought to preserve tahlilan ritual tradition because they find a common ground to perform it. This basic idea lies on congruous commonality in Islam and Javanese norms regarding paying respect and honor to ancestors and the late parents. This good relationship should remain strong for the whole life and should be symbolically communicated beyond the grave. To Javanese Muslims, the death is not the end of history since they believe the life after death. The deceased is physically separated from his/her family and living community, but socially still belongs to the society. In this respect, the deceased is still alive in an imaginary world and therefore symbolic communication should be maintained through various means. Sending prayer and offering food, which constitute a core of tahlilan ritual, thus means a medium through which respect and honor as well as symbolic communication between the alive and the dead amongst Javanese Muslims are well preserved.

[Research paper on “Religion in South Asia”, Emory University, Spring 2008]

Origin, sources and development of Shari'a law

2009-05-21T21:36:00.000-04:00

The majority of Muslims believe that Shari’a is a divine law that is revealed by God to regulate their life. In this view, Shari’a is believed to be sacred and is exclusively formulated by the divine authority through the Qur’an and the Prophet’s tradition as well. Following this perspective, Shari’a is therefore beyond human intervention and interpretation. It is not created by history, but creates Muslim history and molds their society. However, research and studies reveal that the development of Shari’a does not exempt from human interpretation in its formulation. In spite of the claim to its sacredness, critical historical analysis discloses that the conception and understanding of Shari’a considerably change and are bound within a historical situation. The fact that there are many schools of thought (madhhab) in Islamic jurisprudence in interpreting Shari’a among Muslims suggests that this term has been interpreted differently in the wide span of time and within various methods. In this perspective, Shari’a law is similar to other legal systems, which are subject to interpretation and change in response to specific socio and legal challenges within a society.

To conceive of Shari’a in such a theoretical framework, it is necessary to discuss it in detail. This essay thus aims to disclose the origin of Shari’a, its sources and development and to examine the ways in which this term is conceived and approached by Muslims differently. In the last part of this essay, I examine the current issue of Shari’a application in Indonesia in order to show how widely the meaning that this term bears. There is no such a single and unified understanding of Shari’a amongst Muslims in that country. Nor do they concur in one method of its application. As a result, this causes, in one hand, confusion and overlapping in the level of application. On the other hand, this will enable Muslims themselves to always discuss, criticize and finally reinterpret Shari’a under the light of modern circumstances, humanism and democracy and under their current condition.

There is a tendency to strictly perceive Shari’a in a legal sense. This applies both in the West and in the Muslim world. However it should be noted that the literal meaning of Shari’a is not identical with law. Etymologically, Shari’a means a path or a way that leads to a source of water. This means that Shari’a in its basic literal meaning is neither a law nor a legal code in the modern sense. The Qur’an as one of the sources of Shari’a only contains small number of verses that deal with legal aspects. This is an important point to show that the Qur’an is not a book of law. Shari’a thus means a norm that guides human life in accordance with God’s will. It covers a wide aspect of life ranging from the matters of worship, law, family, ethics, economy until daily activities such as bodily purity, eating, drinking and the like. So, equating Shari’a as Islamic law per se is not necessarily correct since the former covers wider aspects than the latter. It should be said that Islamic law (fiqh) is the legal dimension of Shari’a. Therefore the phrase “Shari’a law”, which is quite often heard and written in many books about Islam and especially about Islamic law, refers to Shari’a norms that deal with law. Since this phrase has been commonly applied, I accept it, but only it that sense. It is exactly in this point, namely the apprehension of Shari’a as law, the historicity of Shari’a is tangible. This can be first seen from the source of Shari’a, which inevitably adopts both scriptures and human reasoning.

There are two sources of Shari’a that are revelation and reason. Revelation sources are mainly derived from the prime Islamic scriptures, namely the Qur’an and the Sunnah. All Muslims agree that the Qur’an is the most authoritative source of Shari’a. They also accept the originality and authenticity of this source. However, this does not mean that they hold same views and interpretation of the Qur’an because Muslim scholars, and their followers, apply different methods of interpretation. Unlike the Qur’an, the Sunnah has become a subject of dispute regarding mainly its authenticity. The dispute goes back to the debate about the authenticity of the Sunnah since many prophetic traditions are allegedly produced in the later period after the Prophet time. According to this theory, proposed by Ignaz Goldziher and Joseph Schacht, the subsequent generation of Muslims in the second century of Hijra attached the Sunnah back to the earlier period to obtain its authenticity as if it were originally from the Prophet. It is true that some Sunnah or Hadith were fabricated after the time of the Prophet and therefore less, or even not, authentic. This can be seen for instance from the chain of Hadith transmission, which to some extent missed or disconnected from one transmitter to others. However, according to Fazlur Rahman, the idea of Sunnah was found in the early Islam. The Prophet did establish his own Sunnah, which in many ways was continuation from, and correction to, the pre-Islamic Arab traditions.

The second source of Shari’a is reason, that is the exercise of human reasoning in interpreting and understanding those scriptures. This method is called ijtihad which commonly includes two popular techniques, ijma’ (consensus) and qiyas (analogy). Other common adopted techniques include istihsan (juristic preference), istishab (presumption of continuity), and urf (custom). The application of these later techniques depend on the schools of law (madhhab). A school might adopt one or two techniques, while other schools may employ other methods or simply abandon them altogether. Within Sunni legal tradition, the Hanafi school employs reason in a great portion. This may be so because the school founder lived in Iraq, not in Medina or Mecca, a condition that forced him to make use of reason more often than the Sunnah. In contrast, the amal ahl Madina (custom of Medinians) is an important source of Shari’a law in the Maliki legal tradition, because many traditions of the Prophet are easily found there. While the Shafi’i school seeks to take a middle position between those two schools, the Hanbali school tend to be conservative and is willing to accept weak traditions as the source of Shari’a in favor over reason. Meanwhile, Shi’i legal tradition develops into another direction under the supreme authority of their imam. The adoption of the diverse sources and techniques within each school both in Sunni and Shi’i tradition suggests that human agency plays a pivotal role in the development of Shari’a. Through those sources and techniques, Shari’a has been developed within human comprehension and historical framework. The techniques should be understood as alternative methods that create Shari’a flexibility to be applied at any time and condition. It is through ijtihad that Shari’a becomes widely divided into various schools and spread through different thoughts. Muslims have freedom to select one of them or even blend one with other schools to acquire the most compatible formulation of Islamic law. This will eventually encourage Muslims to be critical, and not merely accept jurists’ views and legal thoughts for granted. In the modern time, the portrait of this development can be seen from the application of Shari’a law in Muslim countries.

If we look at current development of Shari’a in Muslim countries, it will become more obvious that Shari’a is obviously undergoing significant change and reform. The introduction to progressive thinking in the Muslim legal reform that mainly relate to the issue of personal and family laws in many countries demonstrate changes and continuity of Shari’a law. The first modern codification of it occurred during the Ottoman reign. In the course of reform movement called Tanzimat, the Ottoman enacted a codification called al-Majalla that adopted the Hanafi legal thoughts, despite the significant influence of Western legal conception, especially from Swiss, in that reform. Other reforms took place in many other Muslim countries after acquiring their independence from the western colonialism. The reform in this period had inevitably influenced by colonial and post-colonial legal discourses. Unfortunately, many Muslims, especially radical and militant groups, disregard this historical account. The issue of the application of Shari’a law in Indonesia offers a candid overview on how Shari’a is understood and applied in various ways, between radical-fundamentalists and liberal-moderates.

The appeal of Shari’a legal enforcement stems primarily from militant Muslim groups who receive support from Muslim parties and politicians. This plea receives a great enthusiasm in the regions where the remnant of partisans of the Islamic movements, which in the past intended to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, remains powerful, such as in Aceh, West Java and South Sulawesi. Meanwhile other, mostly moderate and liberal, Muslims decline the idea of the state intervention in Shari’a law. They argue that Shari’a should be an ethical guide for the state legislation. The ways these opposing views promote Shari’a considerably differ. While the former prefer to political and structural approaches, the latter tend to take a cultural method. The first approach demands political and legal enforcement of Shari’a law through the state regulation. The second one conceives of Shari’a as a guide for cultural behavior, in which the implementation of it arbitrarily depends on Muslim personal piety. Since the Shari’a purpose is to create a just, egalitarian and democratic society, the moderates accept any law, not necessarily called as “Islamic law”, which can achieve that goal.

With the coming of the reform era and the decentralization and autonomy from the central government, however, some regional and local governments have successfully enacted Shari’a-based regional ordinances and bylaws, such as in Aceh, Sulawesi, West Java and West Nusa Tenggara. Unfortunately what Shari’a means by these ordinances is quite obscure because each regional ordinance addresses different legal issues. While some are concerned with the regulation of women’s dress, others simply include the ability of reading the Qur’an for civil servants into their local statute. In Aceh, for example, the application of Shari’a covers a semi public law that gives sanctions against religious offense, such as biting for public decency, gambling and drinking. The success of the integration of Shari’a law into state legal system, as seen in many regions, cannot be disconnected from political impetus. Muslim politicians and parties play this issue during regional election to gain as many voters as possible from their constituents. Among the most active proponents of Shari’a law are Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Front Pembela Islam (Islamic defense front) and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian jihad council).

Unlike their militant counterparts, moderate Muslims contend that the appeal of the application of Shari’a law is vogue. In fact, Shari’a law has already been established by the state and people altogether. If Shari’a is understood in the original meaning, which refers to Islam itself as a way of God, a lot of aspects of Islam do really apply in Indonesia. Muslims as well as non-Muslims are guaranteed by the constitution to observe their belief. To Muslims, this constitutional guarantee provide them a full opportunity to realize their religious observances such as daily praying, fasting in Ramadan, and going to the hajj to Mecca. All these are part of an essential element of Shari’a law. Even if Shari’a is strictly perceived in a legal sense, still certain parts of it prevails, especially related to private, not public, law because they are covered in the state law, such as the 1974 Marital Law, the Presidential Decree Number 1/1991 about the Compilation of Islamic Law and the Zakat Law Number 38/1999. Special attention should be given here to the Compilation of Islamic Law. This compilation blatantly demonstrates that private law of Shari’a has prevailed in the state court since almost two decades ago. This law covers three main aspects of Muslim personal law; marriage, inheritance and endowment (waqf).

By looking at these statutes, in which parts of Shari’a law are integrated, I think the appeal of the application of Shari’a law is redundant. What the radical groups means by applying Shari’a law is obscure. Do they mean it as a total application that includes public law? Again, their demand remains blurred since they never explicate it deeply. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, as the most militant proponent of that idea, has in fact never elaborated this idea in a great detail. Almost at every occasion they carry out their programs or during their street demonstrations, they always emphasize that Shari’a is the answer of all problems that Indonesia currently face. But the rational and candid explanation of why the answer for those problems (some of which are really nothing to do with Shari’a) should be Shari’a has never been given. Neither do they answer the essential question of how Shari’a will fit with pluralistic and multicultural society. If, for example, their demand includes public law of Shari’a, then the idea is weak for some reasons. First, the history of the Shari’a law application in the modern world shows that public law is hardly adopted in Muslim countries, except in a very few countries. Second, most reforms and codifications of it deal with the private laws such as family law. Third, Indonesia is not an Islamic state and its society is plural. Since the public law will regulate all citizens, then its conception and application should be based on the national consensus. No rules taken from a specific religion become a solely source for the legislation for the public or criminal law.

Nevertheless, I think Shari’a still can participate in modern legislation in two ways; by first imposing its main purpose, that is to uphold justice and create prosperity, and second by adopting certain aspects of its private law. Thereby, Muslims should approve to the application of any law that lead to social justice and prosperity, because this law in principle fits with Shari’a purposes. Likewise, since the Shari’a private law is in greater demand by Muslims, there less objection to adopt it to the state legislation because this law deals with Muslim personal life. However, progressive thinking and reform should always be enforced to criticize this law so that it will be always inline with the spirit of humanism, democracy and gender justice.

The sources, approaches and development of Shari’a law in the current time suggest that Shari’a considerably changes within the changing social and historical conditions in Muslim societies. Reform of Shari’a law is thus designed to answer all questions relating to its dialectic with social and historical challenges. The divine dimension of the entire nature of Shari’a proves to be an exaggeration, if not a myth. It is true that the sources of Shari’a are derived from the revelation, but it remains also dependable on human reasoning. Since the text of scriptures is limited and the context is unlimited, human agency and reason must take an active effort to interpret those texts. It is through this perspective that Shari’a will be always flexible in contemporary life.

Muslim headscarves in the West

2009-05-20T11:11:00.002-04:00

ISLAM IN THE WEST: MUSLIM FEMALE STUDENTS’ VIEWS ON HIJÂB IN THE NETHERLANDS

Abstrak:

Hijâb (jilbâb di Indoneisa) selalu menjadi topik yang hangat untuk diperbincangkan, baik di kalangan Islam dan, lebih-lebih, di kalangan non-Muslim. Perbedaan pendapat umat Islam tentang hijâb terutama sekali dipicu oleh perbedaan metode dalam memahami dasar nash hijâb, yaitu Qur’an dan hadîts. Sementara itu kebanyakan orang non-Muslim menganggap hijâb sebagai simbol keterbelakangan wanita Islam. Hijâb dianggap identik dengan status inferioritas wanita yang cenderung membatasi peran mereka pada sektor domestik. Lebih jauh hijâb juga disinyalir sebagai manifestasi bangkitnya Islam fundamentalis-radikal. Ini merupakan asumsi yang lumrah di Barat. Benarkah demikian?

Dalam penelitian ini, hijâb diartikan sebagai pakaian wanita Muslim serta konsep pemisahan laki-laki dengan perempuan. Riset ini menunjukan tidak ada unifikasi opini tentang hijâb bagi wanita Muslim di Belanda. Ini terutama sekali dipengaruhi oleh pengalaman dan kecenderungan individu. Meskipun demikian secara umum hijâb dianggap sebagai kewajiban dan simbol jati diri Muslimah. Bagi mereka hijâb juga selaras dengan modernitas, yakni sebuah trend pakaian yang mampu menampilkn sosok yang beriman dan modis. Begitu pula hijâb sama sekali tidak identik dengan status rendah wanita. Mereka itu muda, terdidik dan professional yang aktif terlibat dalam proses interaksi sosial yang lebih luas. Sedang hijâb sebagai konsep pemisahan laki-laki dan perempuan banyak mendapat tantangan. Mereka menganggap konsep tersebut sudah tidak lagi relevan dengan kehidupan modern, karena cenderung eksklusif dan kurang transparan.

Kata kunci: hijâb, jilbâb, khimâr, niqâb, veil, headscarf, sex segregation (separation)

Introduction

The presence of Islam in the Western countries has had considerable impacts, as Islam is both a system of belief and a way of life. It has inspired its followers to establish a society in which they can perform their religious activities and maintain their cultural identities. The emergence of mosques, Islamic schools, Muslim female dresses and Islamic organizations in many states of European Unions are concrete examples to support this hypothesis. Although most countries in Western Europe establish the principle of religious freedom in their constitutions, the application of this principle invariably differs. The interpretation and the application of this principle, however, depend largely on the history of the relation between state and religion within each country.[1] The current disputes over Islamic modest dress or hijâb (or jilbâb in Indonesian) illustrate best such relation.

Muslim female headscarf is now considered as the most provocative element of Islam in the West. It is no longer a matter of clothing. It is both a religious and a political phenomenon. “Veiling is not inherently a political act, but rather, it becomes one when it is transformed into public symbol”.[2] The hijâb increasingly becomes a controversial subject. This holds true in such countries as the United Stated and especially France. In October 2003, a Muslim girl has been suspended from a public school in Oklahoma because her headscarf violated the rules for dress code policies.[3] During the same month, two young female students have been chased out of a school in Aubervilliers, Paris, because they reject to remove their headscarves.[4] In spite of harsh criticisms from religious leaders, French President, Jacques Chirac, supports enthusiastically a proposal to ban all religious symbols in public schools.[5] In the United Kingdom, Muslim girls are allowed to wear headscarves, provided they are in the same color to the school uniform.

These various responses show that there are different viewpoints on and approaches to hijâb. Some think that wearing the hijâb is an expression of religious freedom, for it is a symbol of religious conviction. On the contrary, others conceive of hijâb as an emblem of women oppression in Islam. It is believed as a symbol of the inequality and inferiority of women to men.[6] Moreover, hijâb has arisen a fear that Islamic fundamentalism will emerge in the West. This simplification, stereotyping and prejudice towards Islam, in this case hijâb, is in fact a myth. This is induced by lack of empirical research done about Islam.[7]

For this reason, this present research attempts to understand hijâb from Muslim’s perspective. This is neither a legal nor a political study about hijâb. This is a study on Muslim female student views about hijâb in The Netherlands. The main question that will be answered in this study is: how do Muslim female students perceive hijâb in the sense of Muslim female dress and of sex separation? And how do they apply this perception in their daily life? These questions will help to understand what hijâb means for them. It therefore attempts to present ‘insider’ perspectives. It also tries to look at the dynamics of various opinions among the respondents and, at a lesser degree, at the social responses received by veiled respondents (muhajjabât). I interview both veiled and unveiled girls in order to have various opinions. I have interviewed fifteen respondents from May to December 2003, both in Leiden and The Hague. I will explain the meaning of hijâb in The Netherlands by means of interpreting and analyzing the current phenomenon of hijâb based on my interview.

This study is expected to provide information about hijâb in the West, particularly in The Netherlands. It is also a continuation of previous researches. There have been a number of researches on hijâb. Helen Watson wrote about hijâb in 1993. She interviewed muhajjabât in three countries: the United Kingdom, France and Egypt.[8] Nilufer Gole, a sociologist from Turkey, has carried out a study about the veiling and the Islamist movement of university students in Turkey in 1996.[9] Anne Sofie Roald, a scholar from Malmö University, Sweden, conducted a research on Women in Islam within the Western experience. In one passage of her book, she drew attention on the views on hijâb among Arab Muslims, or their descents, who are living in Western Europe. [10] The most current research on the veil in the West was carried out by Katherine Bullock. She wrote about the perceptions and experiences of wearing hijâb among veiled women living in Toronto, Canada.[11]

I organise this study into the following order. Part one is introduction. In this part, I shall explain the reason and aim of this research, followed by the method applied in it. The debates about hijâb in Islam will be presented in part two. This part discusses the opinions of Muslim scholars about hijâb. Parts three deals with the issue of hijâb in the context of the Dutch society. Part four explains and discusses Muslim female students’ views about hijâb in The Netherlands. The last part is conclusion.
Debates about Hijâb in Islam

Although the term hijâb in the Qur’an means a ‘curtain’, as it is mentioned in Qs. al-Ahzâb (33):53, but it has been widely used to refer to Muslim female dress that comprises of a long coat and a headscarf. This sort of garb is intended to cover most part of the body of women with the exception of the face and palms. In this study, the term “hijâb ” is only used interchangeably with the term ‘veil’.

There are various opinions among Muslims about hijâb . This is caused primarily by the way they interpret the Qur’an. In traditional literatures, we find that many mufassirûn made use of the hadîth and reports by the sahaba as sources of interpretation. Meanwhile, some contemporary Muslim scholars have applied different methods of interpretation. Different views on hijâb can also be approached from cultural, ideological and geographical perspectives. It means that Muslims with different ideology, culture and political affiliation usually have different views on hijâb. Nevertheless, both proponents and opponents of the hijâb make use of the Qur’an as their arguments.

Talking about Muslim female dress we pay our attention to three words: khimâr, jilbâb and hijâb. Khimâr means something that a woman covers her head with.[12] Jilbâb is wider than khimâr and it refers to a cloak that covers women’s hair and bosom.[13] Hijâb means a curtain.[14] It is interesting that classical commentators of the Qur’an did not relate hijâb to the concept of female dress in Islam, as it may be in contemporary use. They focus instead their concentration on the verses about khimâr and jilbâb when talking about Muslim women covering.

In discussing the verse about khimâr, Qs. al-Nûr (24):33, al-Thabarî (d. 310/923) said that the word illâ mâ zhahara minhâ (except what appears thereof) is debatable. While some companions interpret it as al-tsiyâb (dress), al-kahl (a type of eye liner) khâtim (ring), others refer it to al-wajh (face) and al-kaff (palms).[15] Al-Thabarî argued that this verse enjoins women to cover their whole body and only the face and hands that may be exposed. He based his arguments on the consensus among ‘ulamâ that during prayer and pilgrimage women are allowed to expose their hands and faces.[16] Concerning the jilbâb verse, Qs. al-Ahzâb (33):59, al-Thabarî quoted reports that, in contrast to his interpretation on the khimâr verse, supported a complete covering or a covering with the exception of one eye. He did not give his own opinions to it, saying that women should cover themselves in a different way from that of female slaves and thus they can avoid being molested.[17] However, Ibn Katsîr (d. 774/1373) spoke in favor of full covering. According to him, jilbâb means al-rida’ (loose outer gown or cloak) and it should be worn by women to cover their face and head and only one eye left exposed. He grounded his opinion in the reports from Ibn Abbas and Ibn Sirin.[18] In discussing the khimâr verse, Ibn Katsîr referred to the hadîts from Abû Dawud about Asma, who wore a thin cloth when she came to the Prophet, but he classified this hadîts as mursal.[19]

The concept of sex segregation seems to have been connected with the hijâb verse, Qs. al-Ahzâb (33):53. This can be understood from the explanation given by these two scholars. In addition to his long quotation of the versions of asbâb al-nuzûl, al-Thabarî implicitly expressed his views by stating that the commandment to hang up a curtain applied not only to the wives of the Prophet but also to Muslim women in general. He added that one should not ask something from the mother of believers and Muslim women except from behind a curtain.[20] Ibn Katsîr gave a similar opinion to this, but he did not discuss whether this verse also applied to Muslim women.[21]

In contemporary discussions, we know that there are various opinions about hijâb. We may classify them into three categories. Firstly, many Muslims believe that women’s covering should include the whole body, except for the eyes or one eye only. Darwîs Mushthafa Hasan, for example, makes no distinction between hijâb and niqâb. The former is only commonly referred to than the latter, but they are essentially alike; to wrap women’s body completely and only eyes exposed.[22] It is only if there is no temptation (fitna) and under certain limited conditions women may reveal their faces and palms, like in engagement process, during pilgrimage, in front of muhrim, during medical treatment, and during teaching activities.[23] According to him, the hijâb verses contain a general meaning, that can be proved from the general words used, so that they apply to all Muslim women. He makes use of the khimâr verse as a supported idea for this, saying that this verse also applied general words. In addition, he was also drawing hadîts, opinions of companions (sahaba) and followers (tabi‘in) who all support of complete covering.[24]

Secondly, a large part of Muslims are in favor of full covering with the exception of the face and hands. Nâsir al-Dîn al-Albânî, a Jordanian scholar, argues that there are eight prerequisites for women dress in Islam. One of which is that women should cover their whole body ‘except what cannot be concealed’, and he meant by this phrase is the face and palms.[25] He explains his method by saying that the verses of the Qur’an may expound one another, and the khimâr verse limits the meaning of the jilbâb verse. [26] Besides, his primary sources to interpret these two verses are hadîts, because, for him, the hadîts functions as an explanatory tool to understand the Qur’an. From the hadîts he quoted, there is an ample evident that the obligation to wear face covers was directed exclusively to the wives of the Prophet, and that the exposure of the face and palms are enough for the rest of Muslim women.[27]

In the Western context, Syed Mutawalli ad-Darsh, a Muslim scholar living in the United Kingdom, is among those of the opinions saying that women may expose their faces and hands. In his book, he mentioned Qs. al-Nûr (24):31 and al-Ahzâb (33):53-59 as the starting point to discuss women covering. But he focuses instead his attention on the former verse, the one he believes to be the final statement about Muslim female covering. Meanwhile, the letter should be put in the context of an earlier step towards this final statement.[28] Based on the convincing explanations of the khimâr verse given by Muslim scholars, ad-Darsh states that there is a consensus among mufassirûn and fuqahâ’ that women do not have to cover their faces.

Thirdly, another group of Muslims, mostly liberal thinkers and feminists,[29] harshly criticize hijâb and they hold completely different views about it. Mahmûd Muhammad Thaha, a Sudanese Muslim thinker, said that hijâb is not an original precept in Islam. In defense of his argument, Thaha referred to the Qs. al-A’raf (7):19-27 instead of the hijâb verses.[30] He wanted to put the debates over hijâb in the context of Adam and Eva when God punished them. He said that when in the heaven, they were not wearing the hijâb. On the contrary, they were uncovered (al-sufûr). So, the principle is al-sufûr, because it is consistent with the original principle of freedom in Islam. The hijâb is, he stated, therefore a rational penalty for the abuse of freedom of al-sufûr.[31]
The Issue of Hijâb in The Netherlands

The institutionalisation of Islam is now taking place in all over Western Europe. However, the extent to which this process is underway invariably differs in each country. This, for instance, can be seen from the case of Muslim female headscarves.[32] Each state of European Unions has different experiences dealing with this issue.[33] Hijâb is now at the crossroad of discursive battles of secular identity of Modern Europe, public and private spaces, the acceptance of immigrants, integration and human right. While hijâb has rarely been a case in Sweden, it now becomes a fierce subject of public debates in France. The proponents of a ban on Muslim headscarves in that country argue that France is a secular country. Consequently, any religious symbol should be banned from public sphere, including in schools.[34] In Germany, the government officials and civil servants are required to keep religious neutrality.[35] In July 1998, the Minister of Education in Baden-Wurttemberg refused to appoint a teacher for she was wearing Muslim headscarf. It feared that she could not be able to maintain the norm of religious neutrality in the classroom.[36] Although Germany’s Highest Court (BVG) has released a verdict in her favour, the struggle over hijâb seems to go on. Seven German states support hijâb ban, while eight states refuse to do so.[37]

Similar cases of headscarf affairs have happened to Holland as well. In some schools, headscarf is not a problem at all, but in other schools it remains prohibited. Here Muslim female student are allowed to don headscarves in public schools, but they cannot put it on at religious private schools, especially if it is judged to be contrary to the religious identity of these schools. [38] According to Shadid and van Koningsveld, the discussion about Islamic regulations pertaining to Muslim dress and separation of sexes in schools, particularly during mixed lessons of swimming and gymnastic, is centred in two main questions; are these practices based on Islamic prescription? And how should school boards take them into account?[39]

The first case of headscarf affair emerged when the local authority of the town of Alphen aan den Rijn prohibited Muslim girls to wear headscarves at public schools in 1985. This policy was also adopted by principals of local private-Christian schools.[40] The parent of Muslim girls protested against it declaring that the headscarf is an Islamic prescription and should therefore be protected by the state. Based on such complaint, the Lower House demanded the local authorities to repeal the prohibition.[41]

The other example of the headscarf affair was in the city of Helmond. A private-Christian secondary school applied the principles of hygiene, organisational complications and integration, and emancipation in its class activities. As a result, the school forced all students, including veiled Muslim girls, to attend to mixed lessons in swimming and to adopt special suits during mixed lessons in gymnastics. The parent of Muslim girls concerned complained about this treatment to the school and they brought the case into the court. According to the verdict of the Court of Justice of the city of Den Bosch, dating September 5, 1989, citizens are allowed to claims for the right of the religious freedom only in states’ institutions, and not in private institutions.[42]

The case has stirred up severe criticisms. Dutch lawyers, for instance, challenged the verdict by drawing a comparison with the English case concerning the refusal of a Christian school to accept a pupil from community of the Sikh who adopts a turban. The English judge stated that the refusal was a racial discrimination and therefore it was against the Race Relation Act of 1976. The Dutch lawyers also questioned the competence of the school to interpret the principle of integration and emancipation of minorities. They were afraid that the interpretation would lead to the suppression of religious freedom. Unfortunately, the case has not been taken to the Dutch Supreme Court.[43]

In practice, Muslim girls do not always have problems with their headscarves. It depends on the real condition in each school. In General, the observance of hijâb in The Netherlands will continue. Even after September 11 of terrorist attack in the U.S., and the suspicion on Muslims arouse strongly,[44] Muslim women are still proud of their hijâb. The daily newspapers of de Volkskrant, under its headlines Geuzendoek, focused its attention on the phenomena of the increasing number of muhajjabât in Holland. It said that many muhajjabât are now young, student universities and professionals. R’kia El Hid, a Project leader in Eindhoven and a student at the Faculty of Social Science at Utrecht University, just adopted the hijâb four years ago. Even though people often make a fuss over her headscarf, she insists on wearing it. “Ik ben moslim, en daar ben ik trost op” (I am a Muslim, and I am proud of it), she said.[45]
Research Description and Findings

After discussing the debates on hijâb in Islam and looking at its actual issue in Western Europe, particularly in the context of the Dutch society, I shall describe my empirical research and underline the important points found in it. This description means to understand both differences and similarities between the ‘ideal’ or ‘normative’ and ‘practical’ Islam, or to discern between textual debates and contextual disputes. In short, this section attempts to see how normative Islam is implemented into a real life by its followers.

Respondents and the Process of the Interview
I set down two basic conditions for the respondent of this research: Muslim female student and living in either Leiden or The Hague. The term “Muslim” here refers to a normative sense. It means that as a Muslim, one is supposed to perform Islamic obligations, like prayer, fasting during Ramadlan or any other activities that are commonly considered as Islamic prescriptions. In this study, I shall get rid of any opinion that does not reflect a “Muslim” mind. I therefore did not interview a respondent who is not, for instance, offering prayer. This point is very important to be stressed here, for the respondent is Muslim.

Meanwhile the term “female” is meant to relate this research to a group of people who are directly concerned with the object of this study. Because it is women, not men, who mostly become an object of the debate about hijâb. Women are observers of hijâb. I include students to participate in my research because the issue of hijâb in The Netherlands was started from schools, as what has already happened on other Western states. I however did not interview students of senior high schools. My respondents were university students. At first, I was so afraid that I could not be able to accomplish this research, for I am myself a man, while the respondents are women. I thought I would have got a lot of problems, especially practical and psychological ones. In general, I had no difficult problems dealing with the process of the interview. In looking for respondents, I applied a personal approach. I came directly to a girl asking for the interview. I also asked them whether they were ready to help me to make a contact with their Muslim female fellows. This has proved really worked. I also used Internet for this purpose, by sending email to Muslim female students willing to participate in this research. Most of them were cooperative. Few girls rejected to be interviewed for they were very busy with their studies and only one who refused to be interviewed without giving any reason. I have interviewed fifteen students ranging from age 18 to age 29 years old. They are the descents of Moroccan (5), Tunisian (1), Turkish (4), Indonesian (2) Rumanian (1), and indigenous Dutch girls (2). The majority of the respondents are veiled students (eleven). Among them, four are newly veiled girls, including a convert Dutch girl. The number of unveiled respondents is four. Two of them are coverts.

The second category is living in Leiden or The Hague. Why in Leiden and The Hague? In Leiden, wearing hijâb is not the issue at all, even face-veil or niqâb was allowed to be worn in Leiden University. It is only recent policy that bans the niqâb. So, it is more challenging to present Muslim female student views on the hijâb, rather than discussing, for instance, its legal aspect. Besides, I live in Leiden. Therefore it has practical purposes as well. A lot of researches about Islam have been carried out in such cities as Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht. I do not see one, especially concerning hijâb, that was conducted in The Hague, the Capital of Holland.
Perspectives about Hijâb in the Sense of Muslim Female Dress

Hijâb is many things. It can be a traditional piece of cloth. It can also be a modern, fashionable form of dress. Women wear hijâb for various reasons. On the contrary, a lot of Muslim women refuse to wear hijâb. So, hijâb means different things to different women.[46] In this section I will underline the most important factor that plays a pivotal role for the interviewees to decide whether to veil or to reveal. They give a certain point of view. It implies that what they emphasize strongly on hijâb affects their opinions about it and consequently such opinions influence the way they dress. My research shows that there are three main perspectives about the hijâb.

A. Normative Perspectives

Islam is the important part of the life of the interviewees. It is their religion that recommends them to cover. Most veiled respondents said that they choose to cover themselves because it is compulsory. They said that the injunction of the veil is clearly stated in the Qur’an. All veiled respondents are always donning hijâb in their daily activities. They put it away only in a certain situation recommended by the Qur’an, such as in front of muhrim, one who is prohibited to marry with. Even for some newly veiled respondents and a veiled convert girl, they are always attempting at any cost to maintain this ethics, namely being muhajjabât. For these women, it feels uncomfortable with their headscarf at the first time they adopt it, especially when they are amid of non-Muslim fellows or in non-Muslim forums. They eventually get accustomed to donning their hijâb.

A girl who adopted the hijâb just one and a half year ago said to me that wearing hijâb is compulsory. “I think it is a compulsory for Muslim women to wear hijâb” she said. “Women should cover their whole body, except the face and palms, as what the Qur’an stated. I am wearing the hijâb not because my hair is curly, but because of Allah. I want to be a good Muslim.”[47] The same view has been given by a girl who has become muhajjabât since December 2002. She said: “Hijâb is an obligation in our religion, but niqâb is not. Formerly, I am not sure with my hijâb, but I know I have to force myself in order to take it, for it is an obligation. I have to perform Islamic obligations”.[48] Another girl expressed his opinions saying: ”I am wearing the hijâb because of Allah alone, not because of somebody of something else. Although it seems at first impracticable, but I will try to always adopt it. For this, I am no longer going to places where I used to go, like a cafe that sells beer and wine or attending any life music show, where men and women mixed together in a crowded place”.[49] A convert girl explained her reason and experience of being muhajjabât. She said: “There is a clear evident from the Qur’an that hijâb is a compulsory. That is why I have adopted it since 1998, when I converted. It looks very hard for me. Some friends of mine keep a distance from me, though some others remain good ones. Even my parent does not agree with my decision. I know it is trial and I must be patient with this. I believe I will get reward from Allah, because I do it only for Him”.[50] These data obviously suggest that there is increasing religiosity among these girls. They perceive hijâb as an obligation. According to them, a good Muslim is one who is consistent with Islam and fulfils its obligation. Therefore they adopt it and they are aware of the consequences. For them, the hijâb is a religious symbol. It reflects the religiosity of the person donning it. They want to transfer their religious quality from a lower grade, a state of being unveiled, to a higher level, becoming veiled Muslim women. Being muhajjabât is therefore considered as pious and religious person by these respondents.

Some other respondents said that hijâb means a symbol of Muslim identity. When they were asked why they wear hijâb? one respondent said: “Hijâb is an obligation, as it is mentioned in the Qur’an. Although there are various interpretations on hijâb, but it does not mean that hijâb is only suggestion. I want to be like a Muslim. That is why I am wearing this hijâb ”.[51] Another girl said: “I am wearing the hijâb because it is a part of Islamic obligations. It is a symbol of Muslim identity. I am proud of being a Muslim, so I am wearing it now. This is the expression of my Muslim identity”.[52] One other girl stressed that the hijâb is an emblem of modern Muslim female dress. According to her, a girl looks very much attractive if she wears the hijâb. She said

Hijâb is clearly a part of religion. Islam demands that Women should cover their body. But in the meantime, during a process of changes, hijâb is of tradition. We can see that women’s cover varies in different cultures, regions or states. I wear this hijâb on my own decision. It is my conviction. It is a duty. For me, hijâb is also a symbol of modern garb. I think I look fashionable when wearing hijâb. When in the middle of unveiled female students, I think men pay much more attention to me than those who are unveiled. So, hijâb is very attractive for me.[53]

These responses show that their religion, Islam, should be inherent to their own personal performance. Their appearances have to represent what sort of people they are, namely devout Muslims. Moreover, hijâb is not identical with a traditional dress. Hijâb is of modern fashion. It serves both religious identity and up-to-date clothes that can preserve women’s modesty.

Nevertheless, some other respondents stressed that in practice women should cover themselves voluntarily. Women cannot be forced to adopt a hijâb. It is an obligation, but practically it should be a choice. They are very critical to the enforcement of veiling. Three respondents have almost the same idea about it. When asked, what do you think of the hijâb and why do you adopt it? a girl said :” I think hijâb is compulsory for women in Islam. Besides, it is meaningful to me. It convinces me in my activities. It makes me more confident. It also makes me humble as a woman. But, it should not be forced to any women”.[54] The other respondent stated: ”Hijâb is an obligation, that is true. But women cannot be forced to wear the hijâb. It should be based on women’s consciousness. I myself wear the hijâb. It is my own conviction. No one can force me to do so, not even my father or my mother”.[55] Another muhajjaba stated: “Hijâb is both obligation and choice. It is a religious personal choice. I do not agree if a girl is forced to adopt a hijâb.[56] What should be underlined here is that these girls attempt to explain that Islam is a peaceful religion. They want to observe Islamic modest dress in the framework of personal conviction. It may be caused by the fact that they live in a Western country, where freedom of religious expression is highly upheld, or because they are university students. They represent well-educated Muslims who are sharply critical to religious heritages.[57] They do not automatically transform the veil from the past into the present. The veil they adopt signifies the freedom of choice in Islam. For them, Islam is therefore what they do wholeheartedly, and not what others ask them to do.

The veiled respondents have various opinions about social reactions toward their headscarves. Five respondents said that they are happy with their hijâb and no negative feedback from the society. When asked what is the social response to you when you are wearing hijâb? they said: “It does not make any different”, “I never feel being discriminated over my hijâb”, “I got positive response in general”, “no negative response”, and “just neutral”. Three girls said that people at first often saw them in different ways and asked them about their headscarves. People just understood what hijâb is after they explained it to them. Meanwhile, three other female students admitted having a bitter experience with their hijâb. The experiences considerably vary in degrees ranging from a treatment of being mocked until loosing intimacy with friends.

In conjunction with job vacancies, the majority of the veiled respondents believed that their decision to be muhajjabât is risky to have limited job opportunities. A working respondent told me that she could have a better job, if she put her hijâb off. One other girl who works part time in a store said that one of the big and prestigious company in Holland forbids its female employees to wear headscarf. Another girl told me that she used to work then quitted. After adopting the hijâb, she sent application letters to many companies and supermarkets, but she did not accept satisfied replies. She is doubt whether it was caused by her headscarf or by sluggish economic growth that has been recently faced by The Netherlands. Only one girl said that the hijâb does not limit her chance to find a job.

It is interesting that the veil does not reflect a political meaning. What I mean with this is that women do not use the veil as political means. They are not representatives of a group of women who are politically active in society. They do not struggle for Islam formally through a political or institutional party from behind the veil. The veil is not a political tool. It is also worth noting here that there is hardly any reason indicating that adopting the veil means a rejection to moral deviation of the West.[58] These two main features of hijâb might be due to the fact that the veil is not of Dutch origins. The veil is a new phenomenon here. Up to now, it has never represented political struggles among Muslims in Holland, and there is no signal that it will be so in the near future. In addition, these girls are living in The Netherlands, a part of Western Europe where the individuality is a salient character of the social relation. They think that dressing is a personal business. They do not mean to wear the hijâb as a psychological war toward those who wear, lets say, miniskirts. One can dress whatever one wants to, as long as it is not prohibited by the law.

B. Historical-Cultural Perspective

For certain Muslim women, hijâb is only a choice, not an obligation. They suggest that Muslims be familiar with the history of early Islam in order to understand hijâb quite well. They believe that it is of Arabic customs, rather than an Islamic prescription, that has been adopted and modified by Islam. This historical-cultural approach has been taken by Leila Ahmed. She claims that the veil had already been existed before Islam came. She explained that during Muhammad’s life time, and only toward the end of that period, his wives were the only women required to cover. After Muhammad’s period and following the Muslim conquest, the veil became a common item of clothing among upper class women through a process of assimilation that, she believes, no one has known in great detail.[59] During my interview, there was only one respondent, a convert, who has similar opinion to that of Ahmed. She stated

I think hijâb for women is not compulsory. It is a choice. They may adopt it or not. The text of the Qur’an is interpretable. One can choose the most suitable interpretation to his or her life, depending on the place he or she lives in. I do not agree if hijâb is always connected to the characters of Muslim women. For me, it has nothing to do with good or bad Muslims. The most important thing is how to behave correctly. We cannot judge one only from one’s performance. The mind and heart are important. Besides, I believe hijâb deals with the tradition of women’s dress in early Islam. It has to do with tradition and culture of dressing among women in Arab.[60]

C. Psychological Perspectives

Hijâb gives psychological satisfactions to certain respondents. It makes the wearers feel comfortable with the surroundings. The other girls maintain that adopting hijâb needs a lot of times to prepare it. This, however, does not mean that they reject hijâb completely, but rather, they feel that they are not ready yet to wear it. For them, hijâb does represent a virtuousness of the women donning it. The wearers of hijâb are supposed to be able to uphold religious attitudes and avoid doing things that can reduce the symbol of religious significance of hijâb. One girl said

I know hijâb is an obligation for Muslim women, as it is explained in the Qur’an. I am sure I will cover myself some day. Now, I am not ready yet. I am not ready to be such a religious person as it is depicted by hijâb. I think I am more comfortable if people judge me in the way I look now.[61]

Another girl maintains that hijâb is compulsory for Muslim women. But, she is not ready yet to adopt it, for she must be morally and psychologically well prepared before wearing it. A convert respondent said

I think hijâb is a new phenomenon in Holland. Its growing presence is only current phenomena. You would not see so many muhajjabât like this ten years ago. People consider that the hijâb is something weird. They think that muhajjabât is strange, stupid and uncivilized. This is what people are commonly thinking about hijâb. I am not ready yet to be described as such if I adopt it. I need to take some steps before wearing hijâb, as I am only a new convert. I learn Islam and observe its teachings bit by bit. But I always dress properly which does not expose my body. I try to dress that is not sexually appealing.[62]

Another girl explained her reason why she does not adopt the hijâb. She argued that the most important thing to do by Muslim women concerning with Islamic dress code is that certain body must be wrapped. So that men or women do not look at the body of their counterparts. The veil is only option for this. However, it seems that her family affects a lot the way she dresses. She said

I think the main point of Muslim female dress is that the attire should be big enough so that it conceals the body. As long as men do not see the women’s body, it is enough. Therefore women are good if they wear a long dress, even though they do not wear a headscarf. There is no veiled woman in my family. I wish I will take hijâb in the future. I will try to adopt it step by step.[63]
Perspectives about Hijâb in the Sense of Sex Segregation
Unlike hijâb as Muslim female dress, hijâb in the sense of sex separation between men and women is very much problematic for the majority of the interviewees. It is also difficult to map the pattern of thought among them. The unveiled respondents do not automatically regard sex separation as something that should not be implemented. On the opposite, some veiled respondents regard sex separation as only appropriate for religious activities. Meanwhile, a large number of muhajjabât do not agree with the sex separation completely. In fact, they never attended to any meeting or forum where men and women are separated by a curtain, except in mosques.
Only one respondent supports sex segregation surely. She pointed out that this idea is good for the sake of women’s benefit. She teaches Arabic course in Amsterdam among Muslim female students, the only occasion she wears headscarf, and she admits that this method has proved effective.[64] One other veiled girl agrees that men and women should not mix in the same place. But she is a realistic and a pragmatic person. In fact, she said, it seems too hard to apply this idea in a non-Muslim country like in here. It is difficult to avoid meeting opposite sexes at anyplace. But, she stressed that, although Holland is non-Muslim country, it is far better than her parent origin country, Turkey. According to her, Muslim female students are forbidden to wear headscarves at universities in Turkey. Even though she herself never attended to a meeting or a forum where the audiences are separated in accordance with their sexes, except in the mosque, the practice of sex separation among Muslim community does exist in The Netherlands. It is in the Schiedam, at European Islamic University (Islamistische Universiteit van Europa). [65] While two other respondents, one unveiled convert and a veiled girl, explained that the sex separation is only advisable, and not really necessary,[66] three other girls, two veiled and one unveiled, suggested that it should be applied only for the religious purposes, like in the mosque, but not for social purposes. For these girls, religious ceremonies and activities must be purified from any situation that could reduce their solemnity. They see the mosque as a sacred place. But, they did not see any benefit from such practices in terms of social relation, like in classrooms.[67]

The rest of the respondents consisting of seven muhajjabât, including one convert, and one unveiled convert girl, are all against the sex segregation. They stressed that people, men and women, should live and interact together in open way. They do not have to be separated by any curtain that can hinder social relation. When asked what do you think of hijâb in the sense of sex separation? these girls replied saying: “I do not agree. We must live together”,[68] “It is limitation. Muslims should not seclude themselves”,[69] “I do not think sex separation is good. Proper clothes is enough”,[70] “I am not a supporter of sex separation”,[71] “I do not see any harm of being in the same place with men”,[72] “I do not agree, because we live in one world”.[73] Although some of these girls have experienced the practice of sex separation, but they are not sure that it is because people concerned hold this principle. But rather, they explained, it is only a custom. A girl said to me that there is a boundary in her family. Men and women should not be mixed, especially when her family host guesses. Men should talk with male guesses, and women should chat with female guesses. She thinks of this practice as a tradition, not religion.[74] Another girl told me that she had a unique experience dealing with the idea of sex separation. She once dropped in one of her friend, who has married. During their conversation, her friend’s husband was staying in guess room, while they were talking in another room. She was however not sure that her friend understood about this principle. She contended that such treatment was meant to preserve tradition that has to do with politeness.[75]
Conclusion

There is no single opinion about hijâb among Muslim female students in The Netherlands. This exactly coincides with the normative debates about hijâb in Islam, in which Muslim scholars do not reach into a unified perception toward it. If such a disagreement has been primarily caused by the methods or approaches they applied in interpreting hijâb verses, here the various opinions about hijâb among Muslim female students is a complex phenomena that has been influenced by personal tendencies and experiences.

There are three perceptions about hijâb in the sense of Muslim female dress. Firstly, and primarily, they regard it as compulsory. According to them, God has commanded women to cover themselves. Most of them base their arguments mainly on the Qur’an. They believe that the hijâb verses are not restricted to the wives of the Prophet, but the verses apply to all Muslim women as well. Some girls maintain that hijâb means to dress modestly. They see it as a symbol of Muslim identity and a sort of modern garb. It does not symbolise women’s restriction that relegates them into domestic sphere. For some other girls, the hijâb signifies freedom of choice in Islam. They argued that it cannot be forced to woman. It gives them a freedom to involve into social relation. They go to universities. A few of muhajjabât are also paid as professional employees.

Secondly, hijâb is an option. It is considered as a part of Arab cultures that has been later modified and institutionalised by Islam. This means that it was not of the origin of Islam. Women are opted either to wear it or not. Thirdly, the rest of the respondents do not adopt it, for they are not yet ready. Although they believe that it is an obligation for them, but they needs preparations before wearing it. So, they must be psychologically well prepared before adopting it. The majority of this groups vow to be muhajjabât in the future.

It is interesting to note that even though the majority of the respondents are veiled, it does not automatically mean that they support of the idea of sex segregation. Only one respondent thinks that separation is good at achieving an effective teaching process. Other girls maintain that it is only for religious purposes that separation should prevail. Otherwise, it will be a hindrance to open society, like in Holland. However, the majority of the respondents are not in favour of separation. It seems to me that they attempt to have social relations to the society in an open, co-operative way. They are trying to bridge the gap between Islam and the society in order to bring them about closer one another. Since hijâb is itself a new phenomenon, they are so aware that their performance as muhajjabât is risky. They could be the focus of attention from both people and the Government. That is why separation, which is more exclusive than headscarves, is seen as a peril to the process of the Muslim integration into the Dutch society. Separation will be a contra-productive to this process. They want to integrate themselves into the society in which they live, while maintaining their religious identity.

Published in “Ulumuna” Journal of Islam and Society, June-December, 2004

[1]W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the European Union (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), p. 1

[2]Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatory, Muslim Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 4

[3]http:/www.cnn.com/2003/EDUCATION/10/11/scarf.reut/

[4]http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/nation/7089094.htm, and Time, November 10, 2003, p. 48-51

[5]http://news.bbc.co.uk./1/hi/world/europe/3330397.stm

[6]Bullock called this common view about hijâb as ‘pop cultural view’. See Katherine Bullock, Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil: Challenging Historical and Modern Stereotypes (Virginia: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2002)

[7]W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, Religious Freedom, p. 175, see ibid, Intercultural Relations and Religious Authorities: Muslims in the European Union (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), p. 1, see also John L. Esposito, “Modernizing Islam and Re-Islamization in Global Perspectives”, in John L. Esposito and Francois Burgat (ed.), Modernizing Islam: Religion in Public Sphere in Europe and the Middle East (London: Trust and Company, 2003), p. 1

[8]Helen Watson, “Women and the Veil: Personal Responses to Global Process”, in Akbar S. Ahmed and Hasting Donnans, Islam, Globalisation and Post-modernity (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 142-159

[9]Nilufer Gole, The Forbidden Modern: Civilisation and Veiling (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1996)

[10]Anne Sofie Roald, Women in Islam: The Western Experience (London and New York: Rouledge, 2001), p. 294

[11]Katherine Bullock, Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil, 2002

[12]Ibn Mandzûr, Lisân al-‘Arab al-Muhîth (Beirut: Dâr Lisân al-‘Arab), p. 900

[13]Ibid., p. 488

[14]Ibid., p. 568

[15]Abû Ja‘far Muhammad ibn Jarîr al-Thabarî, Jâmi‘ al-Bayân an Ta‘wîl ay al-Qur’an, Vol. XVIII (Egypt: Mushthafa al-Bâbî al-Halabî, 1954), p. 117

[16]Ibid., p. 119

[17]Ibid., p. 36-37

[18]Abû al-Fida Ismâ‘îl Ibn Katsîr, Tafsîr al-Qur’an al-Azhîm, Vol. III (Beirut : Dâr al-Ma‘rifa), p. 562

[19]Ibid., p. 394

[20]Al-Thabarî, Jâmi‘ al-Bayân, p. 39

[21]Ibn Katsîr, Tafsîr, p. 513

[22]Darwîs Mushthafa Hasan, Fasl al-Khithâb fî Masalat al-Hijâb wal-Niqâb (Egypt: Dâr al-I‘tishâm, 1987), p. 11

[23]Ibid, p. 65-75

[24]Ibid, p. 19-51

[25]Muhammad Nâsr al-Dîn al-Albânî, Hijâb al-Mar’a al-Muslima fil-Kitâb wal-Sunna (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islâmî, 1389), p. 53

[26]Ibid., 41

[27]There are eight hadîts stating that niqâb was addressed only to the wives of the Prophet, and eight others stating that Muslim women may expose their face and palms. See ibid., p. 25-33 and 47-51

[28]Syed Mutawalli ad-Darsh, Muslim Women’s Dress: Hijâb or Niqâb (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1997), p. 27-29

[29]For example Fatima Mernissi and Nawal El Sadawi. Some scholars consider that Mernissi and Sadawai’s arguments on the veil are weak. See Khaterine Bullock, Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil, p. 136-182 and Anne Sofie Roald, Women in Islam, p. 255-256

[30][30]Mahmûd Muhammad Taha, The Second Message of Islam, edited and translated by Abdullahi Ahmed an-Naim (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987), p. 143

[31]Ibid., p. 144

[32]Jan Rath et. al., Western Europe and its Islam (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 4

[33]W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, Religious Freedom and the Position of Islam in Western Europe: Opportunities and Obstacles in the Acquisition of Equal Rights (Kampen: Pharos, 1995), p. 86-96

[34]Ibid. Hijâb is also of the issue of fundamentalism and human right in France. See Gaby Strassburger, “Fundamentalism versus Human Right: Headscarf Discourses in an Established-Outsider-Figuration in France”, in Felice Dasetto (ed.), Islamic Words: Individual, Societies and Discourse in Contemporary European Islam, (Paris: Maisonneuve and Larose, 2000), p. 125-144

[35]Jan Rath, Western Europe, loc. cit.

[36]Ibid.

[37]see http://www.deutschewelle.de/english/0,3367,1432_A_978043_1_A,00.html and http://www.islamonline.net/English?News?2003-10/11/article08.shtml

[38]W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, Religious Freedom and the Position of Islam in Western Europe, p. 88

[39]Ibid., p. 93, see also W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, The Integration of Islam and Hinduism in Western Europe (Kampen: Pharos, 1991), p. 113

[40]Ibid.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Ibid., 114

[44] Cherribi uses the term ‘verbal harassment’ to point out the discrimination towards Muslims in Europe, especially after 9/11 attack in US. See Oussama Cherribi, “The Growing Islamization of Europe”, in John L. Esposito and Francais Burqat (ed.), Modernizing Islam, p. 210

[45]de Volkskrant, Tuesday, October 22, 2002

[46]Arlene Elowe Macleod, Accommodating Protest: Working Women, the New Veiling and Change in Cairo, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 104

[47]Interview on December 16, 2003. The same date here indicates the same person interviewed

[48]Interview on July 23, 2003

[49]Interview on July 10, 2003

[50]Interview on July 17, 2003

[51]Interview on October 22, 2003

[52]Interview on July 8, 2003

[53]Interview on November 1, 2003

[54]Interview on September 18, 2003

[55]Interview on October 25, 2003

[56]Interview on September 10, 2003

[57]See for example Schirin Amir-Moazami and Armando Salvatore, “Gender, Generation and the reform of Tradition: from Muslim Majority Societies to Western Europe”, in Stefano Allievi and Jorgen Nielsen (ed.), Muslim Networks and Trans-National Communities in and across Europe (Leiden: Brill, 2003), p. 61

[58]The veil in Muslims societies is often described by some researchers as both political phenomena and a symbol of rejection to the Western’s morale decline. See for example John Alden Williams, “Veiling in Egypt as a Political and Social Phenomenon”, in John L. Esposito (ed.), Islam and Development: Religion and Change (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1980), Fadwa El Guindi, Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance, (Oxford: Berg, 1999)

[59]Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 5

[60]Interview with a respondent, September 24, 2003

[61]Interview on October 25, 2003

[62]Interview with a respondent, July 14, 2003

[63]Interview on May 3, 2003

[64]Interview, May 19, 2003

[65]Interview, October 22, 2003

[66]Interview on July 14 and October 22, 2003

[67]Interview on September 10 and October 25 (two persons), 2003

[68]Interview July 8, 2003

[69]Interview September 24, 2003

[70]Interview September 18, 2003

[71]Interview July 10, 2003

[72]Interview December 16, 2003

[73]Interview November 1, 2003

[74]Interview on July 23, 2003

[75]Interview on July 17, 2003

Sharia Law Application

2009-05-18T19:32:00.000-04:00

Common sense in applying sharia law

The demand for the application of sharia appears to be a consistent agenda among certain Muslim groups. This is clear from a recent seminar titled The prospect of sharia-based regional ordinance enforcement in West Nusa Tenggara organized by Muslim students at the University of Mataram's School of Law.

Various representatives of Muslim groups were present, some of whom demanded the incorporation of sharia into local ordinances. They insisted that sharia covers all aspects of life and must be introduced into daily life, both formally and informally. They said that sharia was not just a set of norms, but also stipulations that are legally binding.

As one of the panelists, I contended that such an idea was mostly based on tenuous arguments. It was merely a reflection of the defense of an identity, sometimes of fanaticism, rather than common sense. As a consequence, the proponents were unable to make convincing arguments to support their views, which were not formulated based upon empirical analysis and inquiries.

The main problem arising from the discourse on the application of sharia always concerns its basic concept. As it is common to all Muslims, sharia is generally widely defined as Islamic doctrines, principles and norms covering the all aspects of Muslim life, covering the aspects of worship, social relations, law, politics, human rights, gender and jihad. In its more specific formulation, sharia often refers to Islamic law. In this sense, applying sharia means adopting Islamic law.

Due to endless disputes over the basic concept of sharia, there is no single, united perception among Muslims of what sharia is, what its content is or how it should be applied. Consequently, some Muslim countries apply sharia, while others do not.

What makes me sad, and often embarrassed, is that human rights, the status of women and the protection of minorities are not properly appreciated in the legal systems of those countries that apply sharia. For example, violence, torture, deception and sexual harassment against Indonesian women workers employed in the Middle East often remain unresolved based upon our legal standards. The legal systems in those countries fails to protect the weak.

These facts are often neglected by the sharia proponents. They tend to focus on an idealized perspective, rather than what actually happens on the ground. This is what I call the simplification of sharia -- a lack of recent historical and empirical analysis regarding the application of sharia in state legal systems.

This is what has happened in West Nusa Tenggara. Some sharia-based ordinances were not formulated based upon close scrutiny, but were endorsed primarily to meet the interests of the local political elites. The issue of sharia surfaced in tandem with the local elections. It has become a political issue.

These ordinances were not formulated based upon socio-legal analysis and the people's needs. As a consequence, serious problems have arisen. For example, East Lombok passed a zakat (Islamic charitable donations) ordinance. Based on this ordinance, the East Lombok regent issued directive imposing a 2.5 percent deduction from the salaries of civil servants and teachers, ostensibly for charitable purposes.

As the ordinances have nothing to say about transparency in zakat management, teachers walked out on strike and staged a major rally to demand that the deductions be ended. Not surprisingly, the strike ended up in violence and destruction of property.

Another sharia-based bylaw was enacted in Dompu regency in 2002. The ordinance on regional strategic development planning for the 2001-2010 period was followed by decrees of the local regent requiring civil servants to be able to read the Koran.

The trend toward enacting sharia-based ordinances must be reconsidered. It would be more sensible if the desire for better law enforcement were start to start with an inductive analysis. Legislation must accommodate the basic needs of the people.

Instead of talking about formalization sharia, I would prefer to discuss sharia's purposes and its enforcement. Considering the aims of sharia, we do not have to allow ourselves to become trapped into a polemic on the issue of the application or recognition of sharia in national law.

The aims of sharia are to uphold justice, promote equality and bring about the well-being of the public. These aims, of course, suit everyone, regardless of their religion, race or nationality. It is in this sense that sharia is absolute and universally applicable. Sharia was revealed for the sake of both Muslims and other human beings.

If these aims can be advanced through legislation, whether it be called sharia or something else, sharia will automatically take effect. Any law, regulation or ordinance, as long as it promotes justice, advances equality, and brings about well-being and prosperity is congruous with sharia's purposes and therefore deserves the full support of all Muslims.

In the context of West Nusa Tenggara, where the human development index is very low, and in Indonesia in general, the application of sharia must have regard to its basic aims and directed at tackling the problems facing society. Applying sharia means empowering the law, improving social services, abolishing school so as to afford easy access to better education, and bringing about the well-being of all.

Islam, law, politics, and multiculturalism

2009-05-14T18:38:00.001-04:00

Islam, law, politics, and multiculturalism
Caliphate and sharia law

The Jakarta Post | Sat, 05/10/2008 10:34 AM | Opinion

This newspaper ran an article by Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, a spokesperson of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), about sharia and the caliphate (April 23), as a reaction to an article written by Bramanto that appeared several days before. Such a discourse is very healthy. We can have different views and the readiness to appreciate other views -- although probably we do not agree at all -- and an exchange of views will be very helpful not just to promote Islam as a tolerant religion but also to enrich people's horizons.

With this strong spirit to enrich our horizons, I am interested in joining the debate on the issues of sharia and the caliphate.

HTI offers two central discourses: the establishment of a caliphate and the application of sharia law. Both seem to be inseparable; without a caliphate, the sharia application will never be totally accomplished. Therefore, both are complementary to each other. These grand themes in fact constitute the global discourse applied by most Hizbut Tahrir movements in the world and have become the main idea that links their global ideological ground and commonality.

To the HTI, the caliphate constitutes a basic Islamic political institution that will unite all Muslims in the world regardless of their ethnicity, language or culture into a single community called the ummah, which is headed by a caliph. In this view, a caliph merely serves as a God's representative on earth whose duties are to obey God's commands and realize His rules.

Consequently, it denies modern secular political thoughts such as democracy and nationalism. Democracy is seen to be contrary to God's sole sovereignty. Moreover, inconsistencies and double standards in the realization of democracy have strengthened Islamists' criticism of it. Similarly, nationalism, as a logical consequence of the emergence of nation-states, is rejected because it is a Western invention contrary to the concept of ummah.

However, if we closely examine politics in Islam, it is obvious that there is no such strict concept of political Islam like a caliphate. It is a historical creation rather than a normative concept. The power transformation from the Prophet to the subsequent four caliphs took place in different ways.

Abu Bakar became the first caliph through a public pledge of allegiance by the majority of Muslims.

Umar, the second caliph, was elected by a team comprising seven members. While Usman and Ali, the third and the fourth caliphs, reigned after being preceded by political chaos. In this period, a caliph was strictly appointed through a familial lineage. Following this pattern, there is no fixed political system in Islam. It was during the Muslim empires that the concept of caliphate took its firmest definition, formulated through the writings and work of Muslim scholars and jurists who served for the caliph.

As for sharia, with the open era and democratization in Indonesia after reformasi, several Muslim political parties and organizations wish to retrieve the seven lost sharia words -- the obligation to implement sharia for Muslims -- once incorporated in the Constitution but later deleted.

Although this effort has never been successful in the national context due to lack of a national consensus and disagreement among Muslims themselves, it works on provincial and regional levels.

Some local governments have successfully imposed sharia law in regional ordinances and bylaws. Despite its blurry and weak conception, sharia does apply in certain provinces and regencies, like Cianjur, Tasikmalaya and Garut in West Java and in Bulukumba, South Sulawesi. Each sharia ordinance has addressed different legal issues in different regions, and thus reflects the disparity and partiality of the sharia legal conception.

This has become a major critique, that the sharia application lacks fundamental conception and articulation and thus is ineffective. This reflects more the vested interests and ambitions of politicians rather than idealism. Political parties and Islamic organizations that support this issue are a minority.

Islam in Indonesia is not monolithic, but pluralistic. It consists of diverse Islamic organizations, political affiliations, languages and ethnic-cultural identities. The majority of Muslims represented by the two largest Muslim organizations in the country, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, which decline the idea of an Islamic state, remain moderate. This suggests that the majority of Muslims remain obedient to "Indonesia's diversity in unity" and are attempting to develop Islam in this pluralistic manner. Both sharia and the caliphate thus appear to be less than popular to the Muslim majority.

Moderate Islam

2009-04-25T09:43:00.001-04:00

Religious radicalism and extremism have proven to be a danger to social stability and order. While liberalism and secularism often trigger fear among Muslims that they are being secularized and cut off from Islamic doctrines that govern the daily lives of Muslims.

While radicalism and extremism obviously fail to create a harmonious inner religious life, liberalism and secularism are seen as going beyond the limits of the normative traditions of the Muslim majority. In this regard, a new perspective is badly needed to encourage and mold Muslim identity.

Islam has in recent years been associated almost solely with the violence and terrorism that have occurred and spread throughout the world, from the U.S. and Europe in the West to Iraq and Palestine in the Middle East, up to Indonesia, the Philippines and southern Thailand in Southeast Asia. This simplification and stereotyping occur because some terrorists represent themselves as devout Muslims.

In the Indonesian context, groups of fundamentalist and hard-line Muslims have failed to attract huge numbers of followers. The issues they deal with and strategies of the movements they represent do not satisfy the majority of Muslims here. Take for example the plea for the application of sharia and the idea of an Islamic state and government (khilafa).

These ideas are met with little enthusiasm by Indonesian Muslims. This shows the majority of Muslims here prefer not to politicize Islam, to change the state ideology or to apply sharia. One salient critical remark for these groups is why do they not advocate, for example, law empowerment and the eradication of corruption.

Do these sound like un-Islamic themes? The answer is of course no. If they persist in politicizing Islam, neglecting important national issues and social problems, their struggle and movement will remain exclusive and will become trapped in the formalism and symbolism of religion.

If fundamentalist Muslims approach the sources of Islam literally, regardless of the sociohistorical context of their revelation, liberal-secular Muslims tend to interpret these sources liberally. They rise up to the surface as a synthesis for religious discourse of the fundamentalists. This new wave of Islamic liberalism only touches a small percent of its intended audiences and gains few members.

The emergence of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) and Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah (JIMM), for example, is not regarded as a viable alternative Islamic movement. Presided over by young intellectuals and inspired by Western-oriented thoughts, these liberal factions often issue controversial Islamic statements and thoughts.

As a result, they have in the past become engaged in polemic with top figures from the country's two largest Islamic social organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah. Some figures maintain these liberal organizations must be cleansed of liberal activists and their influences, who are accused of being agents of westernization and secularization. Their religious thoughts are therefore exclusive and appear controversial to many.

The facts suggest that new ideas cannot be disseminated by controversial methods. Liberalism thus seems to run very slowly. This is an urban, elite phenomenon that cannot effectively reach grassroots Muslims, most of whom live in rural areas.

Between these two poles, what position should Muslims take and what ideal identity should be constructed by them? Muslims should take a middle position. They have to confirm their moderate and progressive identity. This must be done in order to repair the image of Islam in the wake of the string of terrorist attacks that have been erroneously and thoughtlessly attributed to Islam.

Religious moderation is seen as a panacea to the rise of radicalism and extremism. Moderate Muslims will provide the space for dialog and the sharing of ideas among people connected by a collective interest.

Indonesia has been ""destined"" to be a multireligious, cultural and ethnic state. This is a fact that must be instilled in our minds.

And it is in this context that the jargon of Islam as a rahmatan lil alamin (blessing for the universe) finds its most actual and clearest manifestation. Islam should not only be a blessing for its followers, but also spread love, peace and mercy for all people.

The writer is a lecturer and researcher in the Mediation Center at the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) in Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara. He can be reached at sier1975@yahoo.com.

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/01/04/gist-moderate-islam.html

Islamic Historiography

2009-02-23T21:04:00.000-05:00

Pesantren and the Representation of Islam in the New Order History: A Challenge from Saifuddin Zuhri's Autobiographies

(Paper, Fall 2008)

West and South Asian Religion, Emory

The New Order’s official history as can be seen from the book of Sejarah Nasional Indonesia represents Islam into two different models: accommodative and selective. The accommodative approach accepts the integration of Islam in the state’s history since Islam especially in the pre-Indonesian history is interpreted as an inseparable part of the nation that played a decisive role in connecting the Nusantara archipelago worldwide and in defending the regions from the European political and economic hegemonies. The selective approach is applied to limit the visibility of Islam during the courses of the independence struggles and beyond since these times belong exclusively to the regime’s narratives. Historiography is thus projected as an effective means of silencing narratives and re-constructing the past within the regime’s perspectives.

If the former approach delimits the application of various perspectives in interpreting Islam, making representation of Islam proportionally balanced, the latter tends to selectively chose sources and data that are in line with the state’s ideology. The state only permits the representation of Islam in the history as a purely religious phenomenon regardless of if its ideological and political dimensions that encourage its follower to engage actively in defense of the nation and in the independence revolution. The fact that a strong penetration of military ideology controls the state historiography has lead to the dominant narratives of the regime and the army. The history overlooks the contributions that the Muslims and the pesantren community made during the revolutionary times. As a result, they attempt to represent themselves in the history. Autobiography thus arises as a counter balance to the state narrations, as what Saifuddin Zuhri proposed.

Saifuddin wrote two autobiographies that are specifically concerned with the world of pesantren and their considerable endeavors in the establishment and formulation of the nation which are unfortunately silenced in the official history. As a person who comes from the pesantren, lived through the late phase of colonialism, witnessed the eras of wars, conflicts, instability and economic hardship, he feels that the history does not really tell the truth. What he sees and experiences throughout these eras significantly differ from the official narratives. The institution of pesantren where he grew up, studied and began his life does not appear in the history. Although he realizes that the pesantren people are humble seeking God’s pleasure in their lives, therefore not necessarily needs representation and recognition, this does not mean misrepresenting them in the history is tenable. Writing autobiography for him does not merely mean making self-representation, but more importantly representing those he thinks deserve remembering. His autobiographies obviously challenge any historical misrepresentation to the pesantren world.

Religion and Ritual in Diaspora

2008-10-30T23:15:00.000-04:00

Halal bi Halal: The Indonesian Muslim Community Celebration of Ied al-Fitr in Atlanta

Ied al-Fitr which occurs after the observance of the fasting month in Ramadan constitutes a very special day for Muslims. This is because the day is conceived of as an emblem of victory after a full month of fasting which is believed to be a medium of self purification, as the day’s name suggests (fitr can also mean innate character or disposition, besides break fasting). Therefore, the day is cheerfully celebrated by Muslims all over the world. In Indonesia, Muslims express their joyous feeling for this day by first of all exchanging forgiveness with the family members, especially with the parent. Many visit the grave of the late parent or predecessors to pray to God and ask forgiveness for their faults. Moreover, they also visit neighbors and might take a long trip to far relatives, colleagues and friends for the same reason, pursuing forgiveness. During the course of the time, this tradition has established a new communal religious gathering known as halal bi halal. Basically this is a public or communal religious meeting in a community, organization or association whose members seek to exchange for mutual forgiveness amongst themselves. This gathering is usually held at mosques, public halls, work places or offices within a week or at the latest a month after this holiday and joined by the whole Muslim members of those communities. In this halal bi halal event or gathering, a special performance which consists of sequential ceremonies such as short religious speech (siraman rohani) and a congregational prayer (doa) is conducted. In addition, mutual hand-shaking between the participants and occasionally enjoying meals together mark the end of the gathering.

However, for Indonesian Muslims living abroad, like in the US, such event and its performance becomes a more complex phenomenon that entails negotiation and compromise due to different contexts and experiences they face. First, Ied does not count as holidays. Second, the members of the Indonesian Muslim community consist of diverse social backgrounds, such as businessmen, workers and students. The fact that few Indonesians getting married with foreigners join this event has fueled the complexity membership of this community. All these situations greatly affect the performance of halal bi halal as what has been recently held by the Indonesian Muslim community in Atlanta. In the following passage, I will depict this event and its performance which I think of it religious in spirit, but secular in practice. I argue that instead of being a formal religious forum, as what commonly found in its original country in Indonesia, this gathering serves as a medium through which the participants attempt to negotiate their own predicaments as alien denizens seeking for a broader common denominator, being Indonesian Muslims living in Diaspora. The meeting thus serves much as a forum of enjoyment, relaxation, recreation and pleasure of the social gathering amidst of their daily routines in a non-communal society, conditions that dramatically change the nature and performance of this tradition.

Halal bi Halal Performance
Most traditions in Muslim societies have a textual basis primarily derived from the Qur’an or the Prophet tradition, or both. The text could also be a secondary source such as the opinions of Muslim religious scholars (ulama) or legal advice offered by jurists (fuqaha). A prophetic tradition often cited as a normative textual basis for halal bi halal is concerned with the commandment of preserving silaturrahim, a good human relation and intensive communication with all mankind. Although this text does not specify any performative instruction, certain performative composition of halal bi halal commonly applies. It begins when all or the majority guests or participants, who also become audiences, come. A serial consecutive performance will be carried out, starting with an opening speech, followed by recitation of the selected verses of the Qur’an that directly or indirectly highlights the importance of such an event. Another speech is given by the organizer or the leader of the community. The core event is Islamic lecture presented by a religious scholar who has expertise and competence. A congregational prayer (doa) chanted verbally by an Imam marks the end of performance. By the end of the event, the participants, who are advised to take a modest dress which fulfills a minimum standard of courtesy in this community, stand up and shake hand one another. It is very common that foods and beverages are served before the participants leave. However, in Atlanta, such performative compositions are rarely met. I noticed several contexts that significantly create different experience and performance of this tradition. These contexts include timing, culture and language background, and dress code. In this regard, the context does influence the halal bi halal performance since the same text or idea about it might be able to produce different practice in different context. This holds true in respect to a halal bi halal performance in diaspora, as what occurred in Atlanta, the US. I argue that the current halal bi halal is a very quite different performance and is becoming very informal and less religious.

I attended halal bi halal after receiving an email invitation from the organizer. Upon performing the Ied prayer in al-Farooq Mosque in Atlanta, I met one of the members of the Indonesian Muslim community that recommended me to join halal bi halal in the weekend. I agreed to come since it would not conflict with the schedule of my academic courses. Besides, I missed this gathering last year. In Indonesia, the date and time for holding this tradition hardly becomes a crucial issue since Ied is a big national holiday with joyous celebration that takes almost a week day-off. Muslims there can perform it during the day-off, or weekdays after this long break or at another occasion. This year, the Ied occurred on weekday which subsequently causes timetable tension. The prayer was conducted at 9 a.m. and ended around 10 in the morning, leaving the folks with only a tiny time to run to work places. Some sought to negotiate this time conflict by asking for a day-leave permit from their employers or professors. However, this does not work a hundred percent. They thought that the fasting in this year would run normally for thirty days until September 30, and Ied will occur on Wednesday, the first of October. But Al-Farooq Mosque followed the majority of the Middle Eastern countries that celebrated Ied on Tuesday. As a result, some people could not go to the mosque but remained working on Tuesday, because they have asked for a leaving permit on Wednesday. For these people, missing the Ied prayer was really disappointing. This fact may explain why halal bi halal becomes a very important event because most community members are able to attend it. Especially for those who missed the Ied prayer, halal bi halal on the weekend is therefore necessary. Through this gathering they can see and exchange forgiveness one another on the same date and at the same place. It thus partly serves as a substitution of the missed prayer. Attending this gathering is then not less compelling since it in some ways constitutes as an alternative forum that mediates their time conflict, missing, and miscalculation.

I came to the halal bi halal forum along with my family and a friend of mine a bit late, but fortunately it had not been started and many guests had not attended. Bringing our own food, we entered the house in which several guests had been sitting in the guest room. Some women were busy preparing the foods and beverages. Special Indonesian foods arouse our appetite. We quickly joined the conversation and shook every body’s hand saying “minal a’idin wa al-faizin, mohon maaf lahir dan bathin”. The other participants did the similar gesture, greeting the audiences with such a special expression. This phrase constitutes a key greeting for Indonesians in the Ied occasion. It comprises of two languages. The first part, which is Arabic, means “[we are amongst those who] come back and get victory”. It echoes the main idea of Ied that the Muslims are symbolically deemed to just return from physical and mental religious training through fasting and gain victory once they are able to accomplish it. The second is Bahasa Indonesia, which means ‘please forgive all my mistakes physically and psychologically’. What does this mean? Such a phrase demonstrates a total sincere expression of asking forgiveness. Not only physical-material faults, but also immaterial-psychological mistakes should be thoroughly excused. Physical faults or mistakes occur when one hurts somebody else physically or endangers him/her materially. One is seen as committing immaterial faults if one makes somebody else angry or sad. So by shaking everybody’s hand, the halal bi halal participants expresses their deepest sincere for forgiveness through their body language and formal utterance. Thus this forum is hoped to be a medium that maintains a balanced harmonious life and empowers social relations. It can also play a pivotal role for conflict resolution, a theme that needs further examinations.

I was also interested in this forum because the theme of this event struck me. The theme clearly stated: “Halal bi halal perkumpulan masyarakat Muslim Indonesia dan warga negara asing lainnya di Atlanta” (Halal bi halal of the Indonesian Muslim community and other aliens in Atlanta). I hoped that by attending it I would have a distinguished experience from this diasporic tradition, and was wondering to see how far this various ethnics and cultural background of the forum creates a different experience and performance and how global context of the Ied celebration is realized in local context on the basis of pluralistic community. I expected few non-Indonesian Muslims would come. And I was correct once I got the place, where there were at least ten foreigners appeared; two whites, two Koreans, and the rest are Indo-Pakistani, Philippines and Malaysian and a couple of Malaysian. Unfortunately, there was no female alien. Most male foreigners are the husbands of Indonesian female Muslims, except for two unmarried Koreans who joined the gathering in search of “true” religious experience. The Imam of the community told me that they have followed several Islamic preaching before. These two guys officially do not yet convert to Islam, he said, but share a common view with Muslims; believing in one God. Like the plurality of the adult guests, children were no less “colorful”. White, black, Chinese, Malay and Indonesian children were playing around the guest room and the yard. From the children, I also noticed another cultural integrity; black-Indonesian and Chinese-Indonesian.

This heterogeneity brings about a discrete nuance of the forum. Different languages are often heard from the guest room. While most children spoke English, the adults conversed in many different languages. Although the majority talked in Bahasa Indonesia, some Indonesians spoke other languages, depending on whom they talk with. Some held their conversation in vernacular ethnic languages such as Javanese and Sundanese. My wife got involved in a light conversation in Javanese language with her new female Javanese acquaintances. A friend of mine from West Java engaged in a Sundanese humorous talk with the host, an old woman who is also a senior member of the community. Meanwhile, the whites, Malaysians and Koreans talked in English with their counterparts. As for me, I should have been aware enough whom I talk to. However, I unconsciously often imagined this gathering as an Indonesian forum, reflexively assuming all guests are able to speak Bahasa Indonesia. This pre-imagination proved to be miscellaneous and led me to inconvenience as I, again, unconsciously, began speaking in Indonesia with anybody. I only became realized with this err as my interlocutor replied me in English. It was ridiculous to be in such ashamed situation, something which hardly occurs in halal bi halal forums in Indonesia. Here, diasporic halal bi halal produce a new experience of multilingual gathering and creates another common denominator for the community. It was not Indonesian, nor was it bahasa Indonesia, but rather, it was English. So being Muslims and able to speak English are key words in this forum. While Islam portrays a basic idea and a common belief of the participants, English serves as a uniting language for this multicultural community. The important role of English was indispensable to address the diverse attendees, as the chairperson of the forum started giving an opening speech in English.

After waiting for a while, suddenly a young guy stood, drawing the people’s attention and breaking the noise. After all guests or audiences kept silent, he, who acted as the head committee of this event, began greeting them in Arabic saying Assalamu’alaikum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuhu (peace and God’s mercy and blessing be upon you). This phrase always marks the beginning of every occasion in Islamic meeting and event. After praising God and His Prophet messenger, he welcomed the audience and explained what the event is in a couple of minute. Before closing his speech, he invited the audiences to enjoy the foods and dishes. At that time, I thought he acted as a master of ceremony who is responsible for controlling and managing the performance of the halal bi halal event, as what commonly prevails. In its prevalence performance, when the master of ceremony comes forward, standing up and drawing audience’s attention, his/her presence in front of the stage means that everyone should stop talking. The audiences are also called for returning to their position, sitting on the chair or on the floor and getting ready to begin. Then the formal performance starts and takes several consecutive ceremonies; a speech by the head of the community, an Islamic religious speech, a congregational prayer and ended by shaking everyone’s hand. This constitutes a minimum stage of a halal bi halal performance. But here, I only saw one opening speech that functions as a closing remark all at once. The core and peak performance is not hearing to a religious lesson, but enjoying dishes, taking pictures, relaxation and talks. Shaking hand, which marks the end of such a gathering, took place in even the very beginning when everybody comes and enters the room. Unexpectedly, the ending of this performance was not a closing speech, nor a doa, but a second round of eating surprisingly birthday’s cake which was served by a girl in the last hour of the event. In this regards, performance is reflexive action that can abruptly change during the course of the action.

After all participants have almost finished their dishes, one of the female guests brought a box to the dishes table. She immediately tore the cover and opened it. A young girl approached her soon and nervously took a knife and chopped the cake and put it in a small plate. Knowing what was going on, some audience moved from their position and shouted “happy birthday to you” many times. Yes, it was her seventeenth anniversary and she wanted to share her bliss with the halal bi halal participants. In my life, this halal bi halal, which is commonly supposed to be very religious in nature, was the first to be mixed up with such a popular, secular event of birthday celebration, something that, I believe, is beyond the Muslim’s imagination in her original country, Indonesia.

In fact, since entering the guest room, I was suspicious that there would be no such a halal bi halal performance as I used to attend. First, there is no formal stage and no banner was installed in the wall that clearly states what happens. In the formal performance, as it is commonly found in Indonesia, there must be a banner installed behind the stage where the performers stands up in front of it. The banner tells the participant about the event, its theme, key note speaker, the date and the place. Second, the chairs and the tables were not arranged neatly in accordance with a certain lane or row, but rather placed in the edge or under the wall or put them in every available space. Similarly, the carpet was laid down in the center of the room. This arrangement gives a flexible choice for the participants or the audiences so they can sit in their own convenience. If there had been a formal performance, the room arrangement would have been made accordingly. This setting arrangement of the stage eventually deconstructs the central role of performers and decentralizes the hierarchial structure between the participants or audiences and the performers. The performers, in this regard the chief committee, and the audiences, the guests and participants, were equally same and constitute the core players of the performance itself.

Another point that constitutes a vital cue telling how this performance will be held is the dress that the participants wore. Some participants did not wear dress that demonstrates they were attending a religious gathering. They did not wear for example a gamis (typically a Muslim long dress) which is usually adopted for prayer. Similarly, even though most female participants were veiled, some simply wore a short skirt. A young man even looked cool, painting his hair red and wearing a tight t-shirt that displays a tattoo on his arm. I have never seen this odd personal look is tolerated in any religious gathering in Indonesia because that is exactly considered as sacrilegious and the doer is obviously impolite. Dressing is always a vital issue in Islamic teaching. To join an Islamic forum, at least the participant must fulfill a minimum courtesy of dress. Those who adopt casual clothes and especially that young guy might be aware that halal bi halal in the Indonesian Muslim community in Atlanta is never meant to be a religious meeting, so he preferred adopting a funky clothe that appears distinguished himself from others. To him, the dress is perhaps a politics of self identity and expression that signals the independence of a youth.

Conclusion
This study confirms recent performance studies in anthropology that “performances may be primary modes of discourse in their own right, casting in sensuous images and performative action rather than in ordered sets of explicit, verbally articulated values or belief”. However, within the Islamic traditions, texts does plays vital role in ritual performance. However, the significant context of performance is obviously undeniable, as what can be seen at the halal bi halal performance. Living away from home country and becoming more engaged in a new society that holds different socio-cultural norms have dramatically changed the performance of halal bi halal amongst Indonesian Muslim community in Atlanta. While in Indonesia this tradition is very religious in nature and is arranged in sequential ceremonies, the people in diaspora simply make use of it as a social gathering that bridges their predicaments and unites them in a comfortable and enjoying forum. The solely element of religious dimension is only given in a fast and short opening speech which surprisingly constitutes as a closing remark as well. The community’s diverse background that consists of different professions, languages, ethnics, and cultures forced them to conduct that tradition in the most convenience performance which seems to be less religious, informal and above all for pleasure and fun.

Ramadhan peace

2008-09-12T18:54:00.000-04:00

Seeding religious tolerance in Ramadhan

Mohamad Abdun Nasir*

It was on last Friday afternoon at 2 p.m. I was sitting on the chair, right in the front of the Emory university library’s lawn, waiting for Friday praying. Suddenly, the minaret of the campus chanted adzan, a call for praying very loudly. Every one passing through in the campus halts their step for a moment, turning their head to the place where the sound came from. It was of course a tremendous surprise, not only for me, as a Muslim, but also for the whole academia. What went on? None is unsurprised.

Previously, in the beginning of the fasting month (9/18), the weekly university’s newspaper, the Emory Wheel, carried a headline to welcome Ramadhan. It also ran two veiled Muslim female student pictures on its front-page, making it more heartedly touching. A few days later, in the university center, Muslim Student Association held a breakfasting. What do all these mean?

These consecutive events were not incidental. They were all well prepared and fully supported by the university. The university is much aware of its status as an international hosting high education institution. There are approximately a thousand new international students coming from, according to the data of intentional student office, more than eighty countries. Therefore, such events were partly aimed among other things at creating a peacefully inter religious community and maintain multicultural society within an academic milieu.

All freshmen bring their own mind-set comprising of various norms, faiths, traditions and different academic background and field of studies. This complex situation can bring about dilemma if no prudent and wise policies are taken into consideration. Of these factors, religion is still seen as the most significant element of human being creating worldview and ethos that can lead in this new situation into inconveniencies, misunderstandings or even troublesome if not well managed. Therefore, accommodating religious observances is one of the best ways to eradicate prejudices and prevent potencies of hostility among people of different faith. Once such a sphere can be created, solidarity and tolerance will be strongly established.

Did the university seek to please to Muslim students? The answer is of course yes. For me chanting adzan in this private university is unthinkable, something beyond my imagination, but it did happen. This can invoke a deep psychological emotion that can change the perception about religious life here. How beautiful life is if such a thing happens, especially in our country in which inter religious conflicts and violence still become the most serious and major threat of social interaction.

But why did the university do so? There could be a hidden, economical, political or perhaps psychological, agenda by giving full supports behind all these events. It could be, but I believe their agenda is much directed on psychological devotion. If they did it in terms of economical point of view, then it seems so silly. Because the number of Muslim student is very small, compared to the total number of the students.

By acknowledging and accommodating Muslim student activities into its inseparable part, the university thus dispels disparities and subsequently creates favorable impression and forges Muslim student’s sense of belonging to it. As a result, they never feel as strangers, discredited or being away from home since their basic need of spirituality are fulfilled and integrated into the university’s agenda. They feel nowhere, but at their own home.

Perhaps the adzan was only chanted at once, or become an annual rite to mark and respect Ramadhan, or even will be never heard again. But the impression is so deep that is difficult to throw it away. When listening to the adzan at that time, my feeling was so cheerful and almost could not help to drop my tears. It is really worth remembering for it was, according to the people here, the first time the adzan was voiced in the university since its establishment in 1836. More surprisingly is that the university holds religious affiliation with the Christian Methodist. If people of different religion trust and esteem each other, giving a proportional chance and space to observe their religious rituals and expressions freely, I do believe, mutual trust will emerge among them.

At this point, two things are in fact grasped together at once by the university that is student’s religious freedom and psychological stability, two things playing most important role in obtaining successful degree of studying abroad.

This approach could become a role model in establishing religious tolerance in our country. The ways and methods do not necessarily mean to be always exactly the same, because of different socio-historical setting. The theories can be formulated in accordance with their own challenges. Universities or colleges as high education institutions should initiate this process by at least reorienting religious teaching method and reforming curriculum that encourage toward religious tolerance and mutual understanding. Because campus inhabitants are civilized, well-educated people, and rationale human being who must be non-violence, putting dialogue at first rather than physical quarrels whenever disputes confront them. It needs time indeed to realize it, but when will do we start, if not now. Ramadhan should become a turning point to change it.

The government should also give full support to this idea, providing all structural and infra structural tools in realizing it. Make Indonesians feel save to do their services at their own country. If this succeeds, we will never listen again a shameful story about a group of people who sought for asylum abroad just because they could not able to observe their belief freely. That was a blatant sign of the government’s failure in protecting citizens and in making them feel psychologically comfortable to live in their own land.

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2008-07-27T22:10:00.005-04:00

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